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ARTICLES 
REVITALIZING SEC RULE 14a-8’S ORDINARY 
BUSINESS EXCLUSION:  PREVENTING 
SHAREHOLDER MICROMANAGEMENT 
BY PROPOSAL 
Stephen M. Bainbridge* 
 
Who decides what products a company should sell, what prices it should 
charge, and so on?  Is it the board of directors, the top management team, 
or the shareholders?  In large corporations, of course, the answer is the top 
management team operating under the supervision of the board.  As for the 
shareholders, they traditionally have had no role in these sort of 
operational decisions.  In recent years, however, shareholders have 
increasingly used SEC Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 (the so-called 
“Shareholder Proposal Rule”) to not just manage but even micromanage 
corporate decisions. 
The Rule permits a qualifying shareholder of a public corporation 
registered with the SEC to force the company to include a resolution and 
supporting statement in the company’s proxy materials for its annual 
meeting.  In theory, Rule 14a-8 contains limits on shareholder 
micromanagement.  The Rule permits management to exclude proposals on 
a number of both technical and substantive bases, of which the exclusion of 
proposals relating to ordinary business operations under Rule 14a-8(i)(7) 
is the most pertinent for present purposes.  Rule 14a-8(i)(7) is intended to 
permit exclusion of a proposal that “seeks to ‘micro-manage’ the company 
by probing too deeply into matters of a complex nature upon which 
shareholders, as a group, would not be in a position to make an informed 
judgment.” 
Unfortunately, court decisions have largely eviscerated the ordinary 
business operations exclusion.  For example, corporate decisions involving 
“matters which have significant policy, economic or other implications 
inherent in them” may not be excluded as ordinary business matters.  This 
creates a gap through which countless proposals have made it onto 
corporate proxy statements. 
 
*  William D. Warren distinguished Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.  I thank James 
R. Copland for his assistance and William A. Klein and the participants at an NYU School of 
Law/Stern School of Business workshop for their constructive comments. 
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This Article proposes an alternative standard that is not only grounded in 
relevant state corporate law principles but is easier to administer than the 
existing judicial tests.  Under it, courts first look to the state law definition 
of ordinary business matters.  The court then determines whether the matter 
is one of substance rather than procedure.  Only proposals passing muster 
under both standards should be deemed proper. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Who decides what products a company should sell, what prices it should 
charge, and so on?  Is it the board of directors, the top management team, or 
the shareholders?  In large corporations, of course, the traditional answer is 
the top management team operating under the supervision of the board.1  As 
for the shareholders, they traditionally have had no role in these sort of 
operational decisions.2 
This allocation of decision-making power follows from the basic 
principle that public corporations are not shareholder democracies.3  
Although shareholders nominally own the corporation,4 they possess very 
few control rights normally associated with ownership.5  Instead, corporate 
law assigns virtually plenary decision-making authority to the board of 
directors and the subordinate managers to whom the board properly 
delegates authority.6 
This allocation of authority is essential if the corporation is to be run 
efficiently.  Just as a large city cannot be run as a New England town 
 
 1. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 761 n.490 (Del. Ch. 
2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (explaining that “the law recognizes that corporate 
boards, comprised as they traditionally have been of persons dedicating less than all of their 
attention to that role, cannot themselves manage the operations of the firm, but may satisfy 
their obligations by thoughtfully appointing officers, establishing or approving goals and 
plans and monitoring performance”); see also CORP. LAWS COMM., ABA, CORPORATE 
DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK 2 (6th ed. 2011) (“The key challenge for directors is to oversee the 
corporation’s activities and strategy by utilizing effective oversight processes and making 
informed decisions, without becoming day-to-day managers.”); Joshua R. Mourning, The 
Majority-Voting Movement:  Curtailing Shareholder Disenfranchisement in Corporate 
Director Elections, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1143, 1143 (2007) (“Directors, acting as a board, 
are empowered under state law to make corporate decisions and all the while must keep the 
interest of the corporation—and thereby also its shareholders—foremost in their collective 
mind.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Rude v. Cook Inlet Region, Inc., 294 P.3d 76, 97 (Alaska 2012) 
(explaining that “under Alaska law, the board of directors, not shareholders[,] has the right to 
make both day-to-day and long-term management and operational decisions” (alteration in 
original)); CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 232 (Del. 2008) 
(explaining that it “is well-established that stockholders of a corporation subject to the 
DGCL may not directly manage the business and affairs of the corporation, at least without 
specific authorization in either the statute or the certificate of incorporation”). 
 3. See Christian C. Day et al., Riding the Rapids:  Financing the Leveraged 
Transaction Without Getting Wet, 41 SYRACUSE L. REV. 661, 677 (1990) (“Corporations, 
after all, are not democracies.”); Jason Iuliano, Do Corporations Have Religious Beliefs?, 90 
IND. L.J. 47, 81 (2015) (“As anyone who has interacted with corporations knows, they are 
not democracies.”). 
 4. In fact, “shareholders do not own the corporation in the traditional sense of the word.  
Instead they own the residual claim to the corporation’s income and assets.” William K. 
Sjostrom, Jr. & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the Election of Directors, 40 CONN. L. 
REV. 459, 467 n.44 (2007). 
 5. See MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 172 (1995) 
(“Shareholders in [public] firms do not actively manage the corporation; nor do they even set 
broad policy objectives.”).  For an overview of the limited control rights possessed by 
shareholders, see id. at 174–77. 
 6. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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meeting, a large corporation is a poor candidate for direct democracy.7  
There simply are too many widely dispersed shareholders who have varying 
degrees of information about the company, differing goals and investment 
time horizons, and competing ideas about optimal business practices for 
their preferences to be aggregated efficiently.8  Accordingly, state corporate 
law traditionally has given primary decision-making authority to the board 
and the managers to whom the board properly delegates authority.9  As the 
Delaware General Corporation Law puts it, the “business and affairs” of a 
corporation “shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of 
directors.”10 
In contrast to state law’s allocation of authority, the federal Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) has tried to effectuate a limited form of 
“corporate democracy” through its proxy rules.11  Its principal tool in this 
effort is Rule 14a-8 (“the Shareholder Proposal Rule” or “the Rule”), which 
allows shareholders meeting certain procedural requirements to place 
proposals on the corporation’s proxy statement and have those proposals 
voted on at the company’s annual shareholder meeting.12 
Absent Rule 14a-8, there would be no vehicle for shareholders to put 
proposals on the issuer’s proxy statement.13  Shareholders’ only practicable 
 
 7. See TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 
20290, at *8 n.14 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (stating that “a corporation is not a New England 
town meeting; directors, not shareholders, have responsibilities to manage the business and 
affairs of the corporation”). 
 8. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy:  The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 552–74 (2003) (explaining how factors such 
as asymmetric information, disparate interests, and collective action problems require that 
corporations are run by a central decision-making body rather than as a democracy). 
 9. See, e.g., Gorman v. Salamone, C.A. No. 10183-VCN, 2015 WL 4719681, at *4 
n.18 (Del. Ch. July 31, 2015) (stating that “a Delaware corporation is a board-centric 
entity”); In re Schmitz, 285 S.W.3d 451, 459 (Tex. 2009) (noting “the principle that a 
corporation should be run by its board of directors, not a disgruntled shareholder or the 
courts”). 
 10. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2015); see, e.g., In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders 
Litig., C.A. No. 5377-VCL, 2010 WL 2291842, at *15 (Del. Ch. May 25, 2010) (observing 
that “director primacy remains the centerpiece of Delaware law, even when a controlling 
stockholder is present”).  Because Delaware is far and away the leading choice as the state of 
incorporation for public companies, its corporate law effectively sets the “terms of corporate 
governance in the United States.” Kent Greenfield, Democracy and the Dominance of 
Delaware in Corporate Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 135 (2004).  Accordingly, 
unless otherwise specified, references to corporate law herein refer to the relevant provisions 
of Delaware statutes and case law. 
 11. See Cent. Foundry Co. v. Comm’r, 49 T.C. 234, 249 (1967) (“The proxy rules 
promulgated by the SEC were plainly intended to promote corporate democracy . . . .”). 
 12. See Harwell Wells, “Corporation Law Is Dead”:  Heroic Managerialism, Legal 
Change, and the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height of the American Century, 15 U. 
PA. J. BUS. L. 305, 340 (2013) (“SEC Rule 14a-8, which mandates inclusion of such 
proposals, was first adopted in 1942, in what could be seen as a late burst of New Deal 
enthusiasm for grassroots (shareholder) democracy; the requirement is still sometimes 
referred to as the ‘Town Hall rule.’”); see also infra notes 87–92 and accompanying text 
(describing Rule 14a-8 and the overall proxy process in more detail). 
 13. Rule 14a-8 grew out of the SEC’s goal that the federal proxy rules should “replicate 
the old-style annual meeting that was personally attended by shareholders.” Jill E. Fisch, 
From Legitimacy to Logic:  Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1142 
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alternative would be to conduct a proxy contest in favor of whatever 
proposal they wished to put forward.14  From the proponent’s prospective, 
the chief advantage of the Shareholder Proposal Rule is that it is 
inexpensive.15  The proponent need not pay any of the printing and mailing 
costs (all of which must be paid by the corporation) or otherwise comply 
with the expensive panoply of regulatory requirements.16 
In the three or four decades following the Shareholder Proposal Rule’s 
adoption, the Rule was a tool mainly of gadflies and social activists.17  
Shareholder proposals were rare18 and almost uniformly defeated by wide 
margins.19  Up until the 1980s, the process thus “amounted to little more 
than a nuisance for corporate management.”20  Much of the law governing 
shareholder proposals developed during this period in which the stakes 
were low.21 
In contrast, today the stakes are quite high, as the volume of shareholder 
proposals has increased dramatically over the last two decades.22  
Proponents are no longer just gadflies and social justice warriors but now 
include major institutional investors such as hedge funds and both union 
and government pension funds.23  Although most proposals still fail to 
 
(1993).  The SEC believed that shareholders had a preexisting state law right to make 
proposals at the annual meeting, but it was unclear under then-existing law whether the 
board of directors had an obligation to solicit proxies with respect to a proposal of which it 
had been informed. Id. at 1143–44. 
 14. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Proxy Contests in an Era of Increasing Shareholder Power:  
Forget Issuer Proxy Access and Focus on E-Proxy, 61 VAND. L. REV. 475, 479 (2008) (“A 
shareholder may undertake an independent proxy solicitation on behalf of any matter to be 
voted on at the annual meeting, but access to the issuer’s proxy statement is nevertheless 
highly prized.”). 
 15. See DENNIS R. HONABACH & MARK A. SARGENT, PROXY RULES HANDBOOK § 5:48, 
Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2015) (observing that “the shareholder proposal rule has 
provided shareholders with a relatively cheap, federally mandated vehicle for expressing 
their views on issues of corporate governance”). 
 16. See Gordon, supra note 14, at 479 (explaining that the rule allows “shareholder 
proponents [to] avoid the costs of producing and distributing an independent proxy 
statement”). 
 17. See Harwell Wells, A Long View of Shareholder Power:  From the Antebellum 
Corporation to the Twenty-First Century, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1033, 1083 (2015) (“In the late 
1960s, the gadflies would be joined by ‘social issues’ activists, often church-managed funds 
and later funds specially organized to engage in socially responsible investing, that again 
aimed to use shareholder proposals for broader progressive ends.”). 
 18. See Myron P. Curzan & Mark L. Pelesh, Revitalizing Corporate Democracy:  
Control of Investment Managers’ Voting on Social Responsibility Proxy Issues, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 670, 676 (1980) (observing that during the “three decades” after Rule 14a-8 was 
adopted “shareholder proposals were relatively rare”). 
 19. See Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule:  A Failed Experiment in 
Merit Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REV. 879, 883 (1994) (“As of 1981, only two contested 
shareholder proposals of the thousands submitted had ever won.”).  
 20. Id. 
 21. See id. (“Until recently, the stakes presented by Rule 14a-8 . . . have been low.”). 
 22. See 2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 
§ 10:26 (2016) (“The number of shareholder proposals submitted to publicly held companies 
has been increasing.”). 
 23. See Wells, supra note 17, at 1092–93 (discussing increased use of shareholder 
proposals by institutional investors). 
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receive majority shareholder support, a growing number do.24  This is true 
not only for laggard firms, but also increasingly for successful ones.25  As a 
result, all corporate directors and managers now must take shareholder 
proposals quite seriously.26 
With the rising volume of proposals came a dramatic shift in their subject 
matter.  Historically, most shareholder proposals focused on issues of 
corporate social responsibility.27  However, over the last two decades, a 
growing number of proposals have focused on corporate governance 
questions.28  Today, many proposals address issues traditionally regarded as 
board or management prerogatives, as a substantial number effectively seek 
to manage or even micromanage corporate decisions.29  This shift has 
become especially prominent in the growing use of shareholder proposals 
by hedge funds seeking to affect changes in management personnel or 
corporate strategy of targeted companies.30  However, Rule 14a-8 was 
never intended to permit shareholders to micromanage a corporation.31  At 
an early stage in the Rule’s development, the SEC added a specific 
exclusion—today codified as Rule 14a-8(i)(7)—permitting the corporation 
 
 24. See, e.g., Mizuki Hayashi, Corporate Ownership and Governance Reforms in Japan:  
Influence of Globalization and U.S. Practice, 26 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 315, 325 (2013) (“52.3 
percent of shareholder proposals within U.S. Russell 3000 companies are related to corporate 
governance, and 37.2 percent of them received majority support in 2011.”). 
 25. Martin Lipton, Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (June 21, 
2013), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/06/21/dealing-with-activist-hedge-funds/ 
(“No company is too big to become the target of an activist, and even companies with 
sterling corporate governance practices and positive share price performance, including 
outperformance of peers, may be targeted.”) [https://perma.cc/J27R-3DFN]. 
 26. See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas & James F. Cotter, Shareholder Proposals in the New 
Millennium:  Shareholder Support, Board Response, and Market Reaction, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 
368 (2007) (reporting on an empirical survey finding that boards of directors are increasingly 
responsive to shareholder proposals, such as those relating to takeover defenses). 
 27. See Donald E. Schwartz, Defining the Corporate Objective:  Section 2.01 of the 
ALI’s Principles, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 511, 519 & n.35 (1984) (“Shareholder proposals 
have ranged over a broad span of social issues, including the marketing of infant formula in 
less developed countries, opposition to producing profitable military hardware, making loans 
to the government of South Africa, using animals in medical research, and many other highly 
profitable business activities.”). 
 28. See Carol Goforth, Proxy Reform as a Means of Increasing Shareholder 
Participation in Corporate Governance:  Too Little, but Not Too Late, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 
379, 429–30 (1994) (“Shareholder proposals on corporate governance issues have garnered 
dramatically increased levels of support.”). 
 29. See Zhong Xing Tan, Stewardship in the Interests of Systemic Stakeholders:  Re-
Conceptualizing the Means and Ends of Anglo-American Corporate Governance in the 
Wake of the Global Financial Crisis, 9 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 169, 211 (2014) (noting that 
“hedge funds . . . commonly seek to influence board decisions on ordinary business 
decisions”). 
 30. See Wells, supra note 17, at 1097 (“Taking larger stakes in publicly held firms than 
did the more traditional institutional investors and employing a wider array of strategies—
shareholder proposals, proxy fights, and litigation for example—hedge funds pushed more 
aggressively for changes in corporate strategies and management than had investors of the 
previous decades.”). 
 31. See infra notes 87–92 and accompanying text; see also HONABACH & SARGENT, 
supra note 15, § 5:46 (“Rule 14a-8(i)(7) declares that [a] shareholder may not use the 
shareholder proposal process to micromanage the corporation.”). 
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to exclude from its proxy statement any proposal dealing “with a matter 
relating to the company’s ordinary business operations.”32  Unfortunately, 
this exclusion has provided largely illusory limitations on shareholder 
proposals, because court decisions have largely eviscerated it.  In particular, 
courts routinely have held that corporate decisions involving “matters 
which have significant policy, economic or other implications inherent in 
them” may not be excluded as ordinary business matters,33 which creates a 
gap through which numerous proposals have made it onto corporate proxy 
statements.34 
Whether Rule 14a-8(i)(7) was to be rendered entirely toothless was 
recently tested in Trinity Wall Street. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.35  Trinity 
timely submitted a proposal for inclusion in Wal-Mart’s 2014 proxy 
statement that, if adopted, would have broadly requested Wal-Mart’s board 
of directors to “develop and implement standards” by which management 
would decide “whether to sell a product that (1) ‘especially endangers 
public safety’; (2) ‘has the substantial potential to impair the reputation of 
Wal-Mart’; and/or (3) ‘would reasonably be considered by many offensive 
to the family and community values integral to the Company’s promotion 
of its brand.’”36  When Wal-Mart refused to include the proposal in its 
proxy statement, Trinity sued in federal court seeking an injunction 
requiring Wal-Mart to include the proposal.37 
Despite the proposal’s seeming breadth, the Third Circuit deemed 
Trinity’s proposal to be aimed directly at Wal-Mart’s sale of rifles with 
high capacity magazines, reflecting Trinity’s concern with “the profusion of 
mass murders and gun violence in American society.”38  In addition, 
although Trinity had carefully worded its proposal so it could claim that the 
proposal transcended ordinary business matters, the court refused to “allow 
drafters to evade Rule 14a-8(i)(7)’s reach by styling their proposals as 
requesting board oversight or review.”39  Instead, the court held that it must 
 
 32. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7) (2015). 
 33. Austin v. Consol. Edison Co., 788 F. Supp. 192, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 34. See David M. Lynn, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Specialized Corporate Disclosure:  
Using the Securities Laws to Address Public Policy Issues, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 327, 354 
(2011) (noting that “the SEC Staff has, through the no-action letter process, determined that 
certain proposals could not be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(7) when the[y] relate to a wide 
range of policy issues, thereby permitting the proposal and supporting statement to be 
included in an issuer’s definitive proxy statement and be subject to a shareholder vote”). 
 35. 792 F.3d 323 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 499 (2015).  Trinity Church Wall 
Street is an Episcopal parish headquartered in New York City that owns Wal-Mart stock and 
meets the qualifications to use Rule 14a-8 to put proposals on Wal-Mart’s proxy statement. 
Id. at 327. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 331.  
 38. James H. Cooper, Why Trinity Church and Wal-Mart Went to Federal Court, 
TRINITY CHURCH WALL ST. (Dec. 2, 2014), https://www.trinitywallstreet.org/ 
blogs/news/why-trinity-church-and-wal-mart-went-federal-court [https://perma.cc/MLL3-
WBFB]. 
 39. Trinity, 792 F.3d at 344. 
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identify the intended “ultimate consequence” of the proposal, which in this 
case was to pressure Wal-Mart to stop selling high capacity firearms.40 
To determine whether the proposal so understood constituted an 
excludable ordinary business matter, the court applied a two-part test: 
Under the first step, we discern the “subject matter” of the proposal.  
Under the second, we ask whether that subject matter relates to Wal-
Mart’s ordinary business operations.  If the answer to the second question 
is yes, Wal-Mart must still convince us that Trinity’s proposal does not 
raise a significant policy issue that transcends the nuts and bolts of the 
retailer’s business.41 
Applying that standard, the court concluded that Wal-Mart properly could 
exclude the proposal from its proxy statement.42 
Although the court posited that its standard would allow exclusion of 
proposals that are “too entwined with the fundamentals of the daily 
activities of a [company] running its business,”43 the court’s approach lacks 
administrability, predictability, and certainty.44  As a result, Trinity stands 
as yet another in a long series of failures.  As we shall see, the SEC and 
courts have failed to apply the exclusion consistently over time, flip-
flopping repeatedly on major interpretative issues.45  The various tests 
developed by both the agency and courts have all failed to offer coherence, 
let alone certainty and predictability.46  Trinity failed to put the law on a 
more sound footing.  Indeed, because the SEC has now indicated that it will 
not defer to Trinity, but rather will continue to apply its current standard,47 
the law is less certain than it was before Trinity. 
A better test is needed and this Article offers one.  Part I reviews the 
relationship between Rule 14a-8 and the state law rules governing the 
allocation of decision-making authority within the corporation.  Part II then 
 
 40. Id. at 342. 
 41. Id. at 341 (citations omitted). 
 42. See infra Part I.A (discussing the court’s holding in detail). 
 43. Trinity, 792 F.3d at 347. 
 44. See infra Part I.A (setting out my criticisms in detail). 
 45. See Patricia R. Uhlenbrock, Note, Roll Out the Barrel:  The SEC Reverses Its Stance 
on Employment-Related Shareholder Proposal Under Rule 14a-8—Again, 25 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 277, 279 (2000) (noting an SEC pattern “of inconsistency in interpreting the ordinary 
business operations exception under 14a-8(i)(7)”). 
 46. See generally J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Politicization of Corporate Governance:  
Bureaucratic Discretion, the SEC, and Shareholder Ratification of Auditors, 2 HARV. BUS. 
L. REV. 501, 510 (2012) (“Disconnected from state law and devoid of any real standards, 
application of the ‘ordinary business’ exclusion developed in an ad hoc and inconsistent 
fashion that could result in tenuous determinations.”); Sung Ho (Danny) Choi, It’s Getting 
Hot in Here:  The SEC’s Regulation of Climate Change Shareholder Proposals Under the 
Ordinary Business Exception, 17 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 165, 173 (2006) (“The 
ordinary business exception has had a confusing history; the exception’s vague language and 
inconsistent SEC interpretation has resulted in much debate and litigation.”). 
 47. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14H (CF), 2015 WL 6503673, at *6 (Oct. 22, 2015) 
(“The Division intends to continue to apply Rule 14a-8(i)(7) as articulated by the 
Commission and consistent with the Division’s prior application of the exclusion, as 
endorsed by the concurring judge, when considering no-action requests that raise Rule 14a-
8(i)(7) as a basis for exclusion.”). 
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reviews and critiques the Trinity decision.  Finally, Part III sets out my 
proposed alternative test. 
I.  RULE 14a-8 AND THE ALLOCATION 
OF DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY IN THE CORPORATION 
The following part provides background information on Rule 14a-8, 
including the Rule’s purpose and how it differs from states’ traditional 
model of board-centric governance. 
A.  The SEC’s Intent for the Rule 
to Promote Shareholder Democracy 
As many courts and commentators have recognized, the SEC proxy rules 
seek to effectuate a scheme of “corporate democracy.”48  SEC 
Rule 14a-8—the so-called “Shareholder Proposal Rule”—is a central tool 
for accomplishing that goal.49  In brief, the Rule permits a qualifying 
shareholder of a public corporation registered with the SEC to force the 
company to include a resolution and supporting statement in the company’s 
proxy materials for its annual meeting.50  To be sure, most of these 
proposals are phrased as recommendations,51 but they nevertheless have 
become a powerful tool for influencing corporate decision making.52 
 
 48. See, e.g., Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 674 (D.C. Cir. 
1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972) (noting “the concepts of corporate democracy 
embodied in the proxy rules”); Frank D. Emerson & Franklin C. Latcham, Further Insight 
into More Effective Stockholder Participation:  The Sparks-Withington Proxy Contest, 60 
YALE L.J. 429, 430 (1951) (citing the proxy contest at the Sparks-Withington Company as 
providing “examples of how the SEC’s proxy rules in general promote ‘corporate 
democracy’”); Note, Disclosure of Payments to Foreign Government Officials Under the 
Securities Acts, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1848, 1855 (1976) (“The Securities Exchange Act also 
reflects an intent to promote shareholder democracy in its authorizing the SEC to regulate 
proxy solicitation.”). 
 49. See Daniel E. Lazaroff, Promoting Corporate Democracy and Social Responsibility:  
The Need to Reform the Federal Proxy Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 50 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 33, 37 (1997) (arguing that “the SEC has attempted to strike the difficult balance 
between enhancing corporate democracy through Rule 14a-8 and preventing undue 
harassment of, or interference with, the primary profit-making function of American 
business”); cf. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 85–86 (1991) (arguing that Rule 14a-8 is actually an “anti-democratic 
device”). 
 50. For a more detailed overview of Rule 14a-8 and its various requirements, see 
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 294–302 (3d ed. 2015). 
 51. SEC Rule 14a-8(i)(1) allows the corporation to exclude from its proxy statement any 
proposal that “is not a proper subject for action by shareholders under the laws of the 
jurisdiction of the company’s organization.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1) (2015).  In a note 
on that provision of the Rule, however, the SEC takes the position, “[M]ost proposals that 
are cast as recommendations or requests that the board of directors take specified action are 
proper under state law.  Accordingly, [the SEC] will assume that a proposal drafted as a 
recommendation or suggestion is proper unless the company demonstrates otherwise.” Id. 
 52. See Thomas Lee Hazen & Lissa Lamkin Broome, Board Diversity and Proxy 
Disclosure, 37 U. DAYTON L. REV. 39, 45 (2011) (observing that “the shareholder proposal 
rule has proven a powerful tool for shareholders desiring to voice concerns”). 
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B.  The Clash Between the Federal Goal of Shareholder Democracy 
and the State Model of Board-Centric Governance 
The SEC’s efforts in this area are wholly inconsistent with the corporate 
governance structure created by state law.  The SEC and its supporters 
claim that the proxy rules simply effectuate rights that shareholders have 
under state law.53  However, shareholder control rights are extremely 
limited,54 and under state law, shareholders “play an essentially passive and 
reactive role.”55  Further, decision-making authority is vested in the board 
of directors, which typically delegates much of that authority to corporate 
officers and employees.56  As such, the corporation can hardly be described 
as a democracy.57 
As I have argued elsewhere at book length, the separation of ownership 
and control is not a bug but rather an essential feature of corporate 
governance.58  Indeed, numerous commentators now accept that “corporate 
governance is best characterized as based on ‘director primacy.’”59  In 
particular, there is growing agreement that “Delaware jurisprudence favors 
director primacy in terms of the definitive decisionmaking power, while 
simultaneously requiring directors to be ultimately concerned with the 
shareholders’ interest.”60 
 
 53. See Roosevelt v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 
(stating that Congress intended that the SEC’s proxy rules “bolster the intelligent exercise of 
shareholder rights granted by state corporate law”). 
 54. See DOOLEY, supra note 5, at 181 (explaining that shareholders “have no authority to 
initiate action on such fundamental questions as whether the corporation shall sell its assets, 
merge with another firm or, under most statutes, even amend its charter”). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text (discussing boards of directors’ 
governance role). 
 57. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (noting the undemocratic nature of the 
corporation). 
 58. See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE (2008) (describing the corporate governance model known as 
director primacy). 
 59. Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 196 (2004); see 
also JEAN JACQUES DU PLESSIS ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CONTEMPORARY CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 9 (2d ed. 2011) (“Until very recently, the ‘shareholder primacy model’ and 
‘stakeholder primacy model’ of corporate governance have been the most prominent models, 
but Stephen Bainbridge, in his excellent work, The New Corporate Governance in Theory 
and Practice, analyzes these theories and provides some exciting new perspectives on 
corporate governance models by expanding on the ‘director primacy model’ that he 
developed recently.”); Seth W. Ashby, Strengthening the Public Company Board of 
Directors:  Limited Shareholder Access to the Corporate Ballot vs. Required Majority Board 
Independence, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 521, 533 (“Although theorists have long debated how to 
best describe the public company, a new theory of the firm has emerged that appears more 
complete than its predecessors:  Professor Stephen M. Bainbridge’s model of director 
primacy.”). 
 60. Kevin L. Turner, Settling the Debate:  A Response to Professor Bebchuk’s Proposed 
Reform of Hostile Takeover Defenses, 57 ALA. L. REV. 907, 927 (2006).  Turner notes that 
“the Delaware jurisprudence, while not explicitly affirming ‘director primacy,’ does 
implicitly leave the directors to make decisions with shareholders expressing their views 
only in specific and limited situations.” Id. at 927–28. 
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C.  Why the States’ Model of Board-Centric Governance 
Is the Correct Choice 
As Kenneth Arrow explained in work that provided the foundation on 
which the director primacy model was constructed, all organizations must 
have some mechanism for aggregating the preferences of the organization’s 
constituencies and converting them into collective decisions.61  These 
mechanisms fall on a spectrum between “consensus” and “authority.”62  
Consensus-based structures are designed to allow all of a firm’s voting 
stakeholders to participate in decision making.63  Authority-based decision-
making structures are characterized by the existence of a central decision 
maker to whom all firm employees ultimately report and who is empowered 
to make decisions unilaterally without the approval of other firm 
constituencies.64  Such structures are best suited for firms whose 
constituencies face information asymmetries and have differing interests.65  
It is because the corporation demonstrably satisfies those conditions that 
vesting the power of fiat in a central decision maker—i.e., the board of 
directors—is the essential characteristic of its governance.66 
Shareholders have widely divergent interests and distinctly different 
access to information.67  To be sure, most shareholders invest in a 
 
 61. See KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 68–69 (1974) (discussing 
organizational decision making).  It seems appropriate to recount the basic normative 
argument in favor of director primacy for the benefit of new readers, while keeping the 
statement as brief as possible and incorporating by reference works in which the argument is 
laid out in detail.  As one critic of the director primacy model observed, “the exigencies of 
law review scholarship entail repeating the same argument in multiple articles before going 
on to apply that argument to specific topics.” Brett McDonnell, Professor Bainbridge and 
the Arrowian Moment:  A Review of The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice, 
34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 139, 141 (2009).  Accordingly, as Michael Stokes Paulsen observed in a 
similar situation, “[t]he result is a certain amount of borderline-self-plagiarism, for which I 
hereby apologize—and which this general footnote hopefully mitigates to the extent 
necessary.” Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God:  A Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 
PEPP. L. REV. 1159, 1162 n.5 (2013). 
 62. ARROW, supra note 61, at 68–69. 
 63. See Michael P. Dooley & E. Norman Veasey, The Role of the Board in Derivative 
Litigation:  Delaware Law and the Current ALI Proposals Compared, 44 BUS. LAW. 503, 
520 (1989) (arguing that the “decisional default rules of partnership law, which emphasize 
the partners’ equal rights to participate in the management of the business, closely resemble 
Arrow’s Consensus model”). 
 64. See ARROW, supra note 61, at 69 (providing examples of authority-based decision-
making structures). 
 65. See McDonnell, supra note 61, at 154 (“Consensus works where all team members 
have identical interests and identical information.”). 
 66. See id. (“In a large corporation, no major constituency group comes close to 
achieving identical interests or identical information.”); see also Dooley & Veasey, supra 
note 63, at 520 (explaining that “the statutory scheme of centralizing corporate authority in 
the board and relegating the stockholders to a passive role is intended to economize on the 
costs of decision making within the firm”). 
 67. See generally Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder 
Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 579–93 (2006) (setting out a number of ways in which 
shareholders’ interests may conflict).  In addition to Arrow’s information and incentive 
criteria, an authority-based decision-making structure is essential to the public corporation 
due to the collective action problems inherent in attempting to involve many thousands of 
decision makers, which necessarily prevent shareholders from operating the corporation by 
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corporation expecting financial gains, but once uncertainty is introduced, 
shareholder opinions on which course will maximize share value are likely 
to vary widely.68  In addition, shareholder investment time horizons vary 
from short-term speculation to long-term buy-and-hold strategies, which in 
turn is likely to result in disagreements about corporate strategy.69  
Likewise, shareholders in different tax brackets are likely to disagree about 
such matters as dividend policy, as well as the merits of allowing 
management to invest the firm’s free cash flow in new projects.70 
As to Arrow’s information condition, shareholders traditionally lacked 
incentives to gather the information necessary to actively participate in 
decision making.71  A rational shareholder will expend the effort necessary 
to make informed decisions only if the expected benefits outweigh the costs 
of doing so.72  In light of the length and complexity of corporate disclosure 
documents, the effort incurred by shareholders in making informed 
decisions is quite high (as are the opportunity costs).73  In contrast, the 
expected benefits of becoming informed are quite low, as most 
shareholders’ holdings are too small to have a significant effect on the 
vote’s outcome.74  Accordingly, corporate shareholders are rationally 
apathetic.75 
Many commentators argue that the rise of institutional investors radically 
alters the foregoing analysis, stating that such investors have greater 
abilities to gather information and superior incentives to do so vis-à-vis 
retail investors.76  There is no doubt that institutional investors—or, more 
 
consensus. See Jana Master Fund, Ltd. v. CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d 335, 340 (Del. 
Ch. 2008) (noting that “with ownership diffused among so many holders, there exists a 
problem of collective action”). 
 68. See Anabtawi, supra note 67, at 578 n.76 (explaining that “differences of opinion 
over how to maximize shareholder value” is a source of “shareholder division”). 
 69. See Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 733, 745–46 (2007) (explaining why shareholders often have different time horizons 
for maximization). 
 70. See Anabtawi, supra note 67, at 578 n.170 (explaining that shareholders can have 
differing “preferences for income versus growth and tax status”). 
 71. See Keith N. Hylton, An Economic Theory of the Duty to Bargain, 83 GEO. L.J. 19, 
55 n.115 (1994) (“Both the excessive cost of keeping all the shareholders informed and the 
individual shareholders’ ‘free rider’ incentive to let the other shareholders bear the costs of 
participating in corporate affairs induce rationally apathetic shareholder behavior towards 
corporate decisions.”). 
 72. See Jana Master Fund, 954 A.2d at 340 (“Individual investors have too little ‘skin in 
the game’ to rationally devote the time and energy necessary to keep themselves aware of 
the details of the corporation’s performance or to campaign for corporate change.”). 
 73. See Zohar Goshen, Shareholder Dividend Options, 104 YALE L.J. 881, 902 (1995) 
(observing that “the costs of shareholder voting include the cost of informing shareholders 
and opportunity costs”). 
 74. See Patrick J. Straka, Executive Compensation Disclosure:  The SEC’s Attempt to 
Facilitate Market Forces, 72 NEB. L. REV. 803, 835 (1993) (arguing that small shareholders’ 
costs will outweigh the benefits of making an informed decision). 
 75. See Jana Master Fund, 954 A.2d at 340. 
 76. See, e.g., Lee Harris, The Politics of Shareholder Voting, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1761, 
1785–86 (2011) (“[I]nstitutional investors . . . do not need shorthand to sort through 
information that may be expensive, or otherwise difficult, to procure.  Rather, these 
institutions have the resources, the ability, and the duty to stay apprised of the content of 
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precisely, a subset thereof—have become more active in corporate 
governance.77  Yet, many classes of institutional investors remain mostly 
passive or, at best, followers.78  In addition, important classes of the most 
active institutions—most notably government and union pension funds—
have strong incentives to pursue private benefits at the expense of other 
investors.79  Finally, as discussed below, hedge fund activism increasingly 
tends to entail micromanagement of decisions that these institutional 
investors are poorly equipped to make.80 
In sum, the public corporation succeeds in large part because it provides 
a hierarchical decision-making structure well suited to the problem of 
operating a large business enterprise with numerous employees, managers, 
shareholders, creditors, and other inputs.81  In such an enterprise, someone 
must be in charge:  “Under conditions of widely dispersed information and 
the need for speed in decisions, authoritative control at the tactical level is 
essential for success.”82  As we have seen, that someone is the board of 
directors, not the shareholders.83 
Strong limits on shareholder control are essential if that optimal 
allocation of decision-making authority is to be protected.84  This includes 
 
shareholder proposals.”); Joseph W. Yockey, On the Role and Regulation of Private 
Negotiations in Governance, 61 S.C. L. REV. 171, 181 (2009) (“Through their large 
holdings, institutional investors are thought to be able to overcome the rational apathy 
problem presented by diffuse individual shareholders.”); cf. Jill E. Fisch, Class Action 
Reform:  Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 540–41 (1997) (arguing 
institutional investors are better situated than retail investors to monitor corporations). 
 77. See Pamela Park, Corporate Governance 2013:  Shareholder Activists Demand 
Voices in the Boardroom and Changes to Corporate Strategy, WESTLAW CORP. 
GOVERNANCE DAILY BRIEFING, 2014 WL 241758 (Dec. 26, 2013) (“Shareholder activists 
took an increasingly prominent role in corporate governance this year, as companies in a 
whole range of industries faced pressure from hedge funds and institutional investors to 
make leadership and strategic changes.”). 
 78. See Roberta Romano, Less Is More:  Making Institutional Investor Activism a 
Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. REG. 174, 179 (2001) (“The fact 
that in contrast to public pension funds, private pension and mutual funds do not engage in 
activism has been explained by the competitive nature of the industry, or more pejoratively, 
as cost-conscious private funds’ free-riding on the expenditures of activist public funds.”); 
Anna Sandor, Leveraging International Law to Incentivize Value-Added Shareholding:  Why 
Foreign Sovereign Wealth Funds Still Matter and How They Can Improve Shareholder 
Governance, 46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 947, 961 (2015) (“Other institutional investors, such as 
mutual funds, are similarly critiqued for their penchant for passive investment.”). 
 79. See Romano, supra note 78, at 231–32 (discussing incentives of managers of such 
funds to pursue private benefits). 
 80. See infra Part II. 
 81. Given the collective action problems inherent with such a large number of potential 
decision makers, the differing interests of shareholders, and their varying levels of knowledge 
about the firm, it is “cheaper and more efficient to transmit all the pieces of information once to a 
central place” and to have the central office “make the collective decision and transmit it rather 
than retransmit all the information on which the decision is based.” ARROW, supra note 61, at 68 
nn.3–4. 
 82. Id. at 69. 
 83. See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text (discussing allocation of decision-
making authority within the corporation). 
 84. If the foregoing analysis has explanatory power, it might fairly be asked, why do we 
observe any shareholder voting rights at all?  For a discussion of that question, explaining 
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both limits on direct shareholder decision making and limits on shareholder 
oversight of the board, because giving shareholders a power of review 
differs little from giving them the power to make management decisions in 
the first place.85  As Arrow explained: 
Clearly, a sufficiently strict and continuous organ of [accountability] can 
easily amount to a denial of authority.  If every decision of A is to be 
reviewed by B, then all we have really is a shift in the locus of authority 
from A to B and hence no solution to the original problem.86 
D.  How Rule 14a-8 Changes the Allocation of Authority 
Within Corporate Governance 
In principle, Rule 14a-8 contains protections designed to prevent it from 
being used as a tool for effectuating a shift in the locus of corporate 
decision making from the board to the shareholders.  As the D.C. Circuit 
explained, the Rule’s drafters recognized that “management cannot exercise 
its specialized talents effectively if corporate investors assert the power to 
dictate the minutiae of daily business decisions.”87  Accordingly, the Rule 
contains several eligibility requirements designed to ensure that shareholder 
proponents have some minimum amount of skin in the game.88  In addition, 
the Rule contains thirteen substantive bases for excluding a proposal.89 
 
why corporate law allows only shareholders to participate in corporate decision making (to 
the limited extent it does so) and not other constituencies, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, The 
Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 603–16 (2006). 
 85. See John D. Donovan, Jr., Derivative Litigation and the Business Judgment Rule in 
Massachusetts:  Houle v. Low, 34 BOS. B.J., Nov.–Dec. 1990, at 22, 27 (observing that “the 
power to review constitutes the power to decide”). 
 86. ARROW, supra note 61, at 78. 
 87. Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated 
as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972). 
 88. See generally Palmiter, supra note 19, at 886 (“Many of the rule’s access conditions 
seek to ensure an orderly solicitation process so that shareholder proposals do not choke the 
company-funded proxy mechanism or interfere with management’s solicitation efforts.”).  
For example, Rule 14a-8(b)(1) limits eligibility to use the Rule to shareholders who have 
owned at least 1 percent or $2,000, whichever is less, of the issuer’s voting securities for at 
least one year prior to the date on which the proposal is submitted. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
8(b)(1) (2015).  Rule 14a-8(c) provides that a shareholder may only submit one proposal per 
corporation per year. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c).  There is no limit to the number of 
companies to which a proponent can submit proposals in a given year, however, nor is there 
any limit on the number of proposals a company may be obliged to include in its proxy 
statement. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 50, at 296 (discussing eligibility requirements under 
the Rule). 
 89. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i) (setting out substantive bases for excluding a proposal); 
see also Palmiter, supra note 19, at 888 (explaining that the substantive exclusions “of Rule 
14a-8 filter out vexatious, illegal, deceptive, and unintelligible proposals”).  If the registrant 
believes the proposal can be excluded from its proxy statement, it must notify the SEC that 
the registrant intends to exclude the proposal. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(j)(1) (“If the 
company intends to exclude a proposal from its proxy materials, it must file its reasons with 
the Commission no later than 80 calendar days before it files its definitive proxy statement 
and form of proxy with the Commission.”).  A copy of the notice must also be sent to the 
proponent. See id.  If the SEC staff agrees that the proposal can be excluded, it issues a so-
called “no-action letter,” which states that the staff will not recommend that the SEC bring 
an enforcement proceeding against the issuer if the proposal is excluded. See generally 
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The substantive ground for exclusion most directly relevant for present 
purposes is Rule 14a-8(i)(7), which permits exclusion of proposals relating 
to ordinary business operations.90  This exclusion is intended to “to relieve 
the management of the necessity of including in its proxy material security 
holder proposals which relate to matters falling within the province of 
management.”91  Specifically, Rule 14a-8(i)(7) permits exclusion of a 
proposal that “seeks to ‘micro-manage’ the company by probing too deeply 
into matters of a complex nature upon which shareholders, as a group, 
would not be in a position to make an informed judgment.”92 
II.  THE TRINITY DECISION 
The SEC added the ordinary business exception to the Rule to give 
“recognition to the principle of corporate law that management of the 
business . . . is vested in its Board of Directors.”93  Unfortunately, 
implementing this seemingly simple proposition has proven to be one of the 
most challenging aspects of Rule 14a-8’s jurisprudence.94  In large part, the 
problem arises from the SEC’s and courts’ inability to develop a 
satisfactory definition of “ordinary business.”95  In addition, the SEC and 
courts have insisted that whatever “ordinary business” means, the exclusion 
does not permit exclusion of proposals involving “matters which have 
 
Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters:  
Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 929–66 (1998) 
(describing the no-action process).  However, if the staff determines that the proposal should 
be included in management’s proxy statement, the staff notifies the issuer that the SEC may 
bring an enforcement action if the proposal is excluded.  Whichever side loses at the staff 
level can ask the SEC Commissioners to review the staff’s decision.  After review by the 
Commissioners, the losing party can seek judicial review by the U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia, but these reviews are quite rare. See Med. Comm. for 
Human Rights, 432 F.2d at 666 (discussing appellate review of SEC review of a staff 
determination).  If management is the losing party at the staff level, it typically acquiesces in 
the staff’s decision.  If the proponent loses at the staff level, the proponent typically seeks 
injunctive relief in federal district court. See, e.g., Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers 
Union v. SEC, 15 F.3d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that a proponent who believes that 
the registrant improperly excluded a proposal may seek judicial determination in a federal 
district court). 
 90. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7) (permitting exclusion of a “proposal [that] deals with a 
matter relating to the company’s ordinary business operations”). 
 91. Solicitation of Proxies, 18 Fed. Reg. 6646, 6647 (proposed Oct. 20, 1953) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
 92. Apache Corp. v. N.Y.C. Emps. Ret. Sys., 621 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450 (S.D. Tex. 2008) 
(quoting Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,106, 29,108 (May 
28, 1998)). 
 93. N.Y.C. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Brunswick Corp., 789 F. Supp. 144, 146–47 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992). 
 94. See Lazaroff, supra note 49, at 62 (noting that “the scope of the ordinary business 
exception remains perhaps the most perplexing issue in Rule 14a-8 jurisprudence”). 
 95. See, e.g., Trinity Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323, 346 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(complaining that “the Commission has adopted what can only be described as a ‘we-know-
it-when-we-see-it’ approach”); see also Grimes v. Centerior Energy Corp., 909 F.2d 529, 
531 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (stating that “the phrase ‘ordinary business operations’ . . . has no 
precise definition”); Apache Corp., 621 F. Supp. 2d at 449 (“The term ‘ordinary business 
operations’ escapes formal definition.”). 
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significant policy, economic or other implications inherent in them,”96 
which substantially reduces the number of proposals excludable as 
mundane.  These difficulties threaten to render the ordinary business 
exclusion largely ineffective.97  Trinity Wall Street v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc.98 thus provided a crucial test of whether the exception retained any 
teeth as a limitation on institutional investor micromanagement. 
A.  Background on the Ordinary Business Exclusion 
When Rule 14a-8 was originally adopted, it contained no exceptions 
other than an implied one requiring that the proposal be a proper one for 
shareholder action.99  In 1953, the Rule was amended to include the 
exclusion for ordinary business matters now codified as Rule 14a-8(i)(7).100  
In doing so, the SEC recognized that permitting shareholders to advance 
proposals relating to ordinary business matters would be inconsistent with 
the bedrock state corporate law principle that “leaves the conduct of 
ordinary business operations to corporate directors and officers rather than 
the shareholders.”101 
The SEC believed that state law “is rarely conclusive as to what is or is 
not ordinary business,” which led the SEC staff and courts to develop a 
federal standard to define the term.102  A critical moment in that process 
came in 1976, when the SEC expressed concern that the ordinary business 
exception was being used to omit proposals “that involve matters of 
considerable importance to the issuer and its security holders.”103  To 
address that concern, the SEC issued administrative guidance positing that 
the ordinary business exception did not permit exclusion of “matters which 
have significant policy, economic or other implications inherent in 
 
 96. Austin v. Consol. Edison Co., 788 F. Supp. 192, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting 
Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, 41 Fed. Reg. 52,994, 
52,998 (1976)). 
 97. As I have observed elsewhere: 
Under current law, the ordinary business exclusion is essentially toothless.  The 
SEC requires companies to include proposals relating to stock option re-pricing, 
sale of genetically modified foods and tobacco products by their manufacturers, 
disclosure of political activities and support to political entities and candidates, 
executive compensation, and environmental issues.  Obviously, however, these 
sort of ordinary business decisions are core board prerogatives. 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Preserving Director Primacy by Managing Shareholder 
Interventions, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 231, 246 (Jennifer G. Hill 
& Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015). 
 98. 792 F.3d 323 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 499 (2015). 
 99. See Solicitation of Proxies Under the Act, Exchange Act Release No. 3347, 7 Fed. 
Reg. 10,655, 10,656 (Dec. 22, 1942) (adopting the original rule). 
 100. See Uhlenbrock, supra note 45, at 285 (discussing the history of the exclusion). 
 101. Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 821 F. 
Supp. 877, 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 102. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8, Exchange Act Release No. 19,135, 47 Fed. 
Reg. 47,420, 47,429 (Oct. 26, 1982) [hereinafter 1982 Proposing Release]. 
 103. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8, Exchange Act Release No. 12,598, 41 Fed. 
Reg. 29,982, 29,984 (July 20, 1976).   
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them.”104  As an example of a proposal that should not have been excluded 
as ordinary business, the SEC cited “a proposal that a utility company not 
construct a proposed nuclear power plant.”105  In the future, the SEC 
opined, “proposals of that nature, as well as others that have major 
implications, [would] be considered beyond the realm of an issuer’s 
ordinary business operations.”106 
The 1976 guidance specifically endorsed a two-prong test for 
determining whether a proposal could be excluded under the ordinary 
business exception:  “where proposals involve business matters that [1] are 
mundane in nature and [2] do not involve any substantial policy or other 
considerations, the subparagraph may be relied upon to omit them.”107  
Over the next sixteen years, however, the test was applied haphazardly, 
especially with respect to employee benefits, employment discrimination, 
and related matters.108 
In 1992, perhaps motivated by a desire to provide greater certainty, the 
SEC for the first time adopted a bright-line position that effectively 
excluded an entire category of social issue proposals.  Cracker Barrel Old 
Country Stores attempted to exclude a shareholder proposal calling on the 
board of directors to include sexual orientation in its antidiscrimination 
policy.109  In a no-action letter issued by the SEC’s Division of Corporation 
Finance (“Cracker Barrel no-action letter”), the SEC took the position that 
all employment-related shareholder proposals—including those raising 
social policy issues—could be excluded under the ordinary business 
exclusion.110 
Subsequent litigation developed two issues.  First, if a shareholder 
proponent sued a company whose management relied on the Cracker Barrel 
no-action letter to justify excluding an employment-related proposal from 
the proxy statement, should the reviewing court defer to the SEC’s 
position?  In Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc.,111 a federal district court held that deference was not required 
and, moreover, that proposals relating to a company’s affirmative action 
policies were not per se excludible as ordinary business under 
Rule 14a-8(i)(7).112 
Second, was the SEC’s position in the Cracker Barrel no-action letter 
valid?  In other words, could the SEC properly apply the Cracker Barrel 
 
 104. Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act 
Release No. 12,999, 10 SEC Docket 1006, 1012 (Nov. 22, 1976). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See Phillip R. Stanton, Recent Development, SEC Reverses Cracker Barrel No-
Action Letter, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 979, 983 (1999) (“During this period, the SEC applied this 
two-part test in a manner that was, according to many commentators, neither consistent nor 
appropriate.”). 
 109. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1992–1993 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 76,418, 77,284–85 (Oct. 13, 1992). 
 110. Id. at 77,287. 
 111. 821 F. Supp. 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 112. See id. at 889–92 (discussing issues of deference and regulatory interpretation). 
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no-action letter’s interpretation in internal agency processes, such as when 
issuing a no-action letter?  In New York City Employees’ Retirement System 
v. SEC,113 the district court ruled that the SEC’s Cracker Barrel position 
was itself invalid because the SEC had failed to comply with federal 
administrative procedures in promulgating the position.114  The Second 
Circuit reversed, thereby allowing the SEC to apply its Cracker Barrel 
position internally, but in doing so concurred with the lower court’s view 
that the Cracker Barrel no-action letter was not binding on courts.115 
In 1998, the SEC adopted amendments to Rule 14a-8 that, among other 
things, reversed its Cracker Barrel position.116  In promulgating this change, 
the SEC emphasized that employment discrimination was a consistent topic 
of public debate and restated its belief that Rule 14a-8(i)(7) did not permit 
exclusion of proposals that raise significant social policy issues.117  
Proposals broadly relating to issues such as affirmative action and other 
employment discrimination matters thus generally are not excludable.118 
B.  Pre-Trinity Applications of the Exclusion 
As the ordinary business exclusion has developed, it has become 
increasingly clear that “ordinary” does not mean “ordinary” in the 
dictionary sense of the word.  As the Trinity Court noted, for example, “the 
term ‘ordinary business’ continues to ‘refer[] to matters that are not 
necessarily “ordinary” in the common meaning of the word’ and ‘is rooted 
in the corporate law concept providing management with flexibility in 
directing certain core matters involving the company’s business and 
operations.’”119  As such, “the opaque term ‘ordinary business’ . . . is 
neither self-defining nor consistent in its meaning across different corporate 
contexts.”120 
Much of the problem relates to the inherently subjective nature of the 
public policy prong of the test.  In Austin v. Consolidated Edison Co. of 
New York,121 for example, the plaintiffs put forward a proposal 
recommending that the company allow employees to retire with full 
 
 113. 843 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev’d, 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 114. Id. 
 115. N.Y.C. Emps. Ret. Sys., 45 F.3d at 11–14. 
 116. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 
40,108, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,106, 29,106 (May 28, 1998) [hereinafter 1998 Adopting Release]. 
 117. Id. 
 118. For example, in N.Y.C. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Dole Food Co., 795 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992), the proponent offered a proposal requesting Dole to study the potential impact on the 
company of various pending national health care reform proposals.  Dole relied on 
Rule 14a-8(i)(7) to exclude the proposal, among other provisions.  The court rejected Dole’s 
argument.  Although employee benefits generally are an ordinary business matter, “a 
significant strategic decision” as to employee benefits fell outside the scope of ordinary 
business matters. Id. at 100. 
 119. Trinity Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323, 340 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting 
1998 Adopting Release, supra note 116). 
 120. Id. at 337. 
 121. 788 F. Supp. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
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benefits after thirty years of service regardless of age.122  The court 
authorized the issuer to exclude the proposal as impinging on an ordinary 
business matter.123  Instead of grounding its holding on deference to the 
board’s authority over employee benefits, the court observed that the issue 
of “enhanced pension rights” for workers “has not yet captured public 
attention and concern as has the issue of senior executive compensation.”124  
In other words, the proposal was excluded not because it attempted to 
micromanage company human relations policy, but because the issue got 
less press and regulatory attention than senior executive compensation.  
Likewise, the SEC refused to issue a no-action letter authorizing Eli Lilly & 
Co. to exclude a shareholder proposal relating to drug pricing.125  As with 
the pension benefits at issue in Austin, “corporate pricing decisions would 
seem to fall within the core of business decisions delegated to management 
rather than to shareholders.”126  Unlike the plaintiffs in Austin, however, the 
Eli Lilly proponent succeeded because “the shareholder argued that media 
attention to the issue of fairness in drug pricing had made it a ‘crucial 
national issue.’”127  The implication of such cases is that the significance of 
a proposal turns at least in part on whether its subject matter has become a 
routine story for CNBC or CNN.128 
In other cases, such as Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,129 congressional attention on the issue has been 
cited as evidence of its significance.  In Amalgamated Clothing, the 
shareholders’ proposal called “for Wal-Mart’s directors to prepare and 
distribute reports about Wal-Mart’s equal employment opportunity (‘EEO’) 
and affirmative action policies, programs and data, along with a description 
of Wal-Mart’s efforts to (1) publicize its EEO policies to suppliers; and (2) 
purchase goods and services from minority- and female-owned 
suppliers.”130  In concluding that the proposal raised significant policy 
issues, the court cited “the continual interest of Congress in employment 
discrimination since 1964, which was most recently underscored in the 
Civil Rights and Glass Ceiling Acts of 1991.”131 
 
 122. See id. at 193 (“On December 30, 1991, plaintiffs’ counsel presented to defendant 
for inclusion in its proxy materials a proposed corporate resolution endorsing various 
changes in the pension rights of defendant’s employees, most significant of which is one that 
would permit employees to retire with no actuarial reduction of their pension rights after 30 
years of service, regardless of age.”). 
 123. See id. at 196 (holding that “the disputed pension proposal fits comfortably within 
the exception for ‘ordinary business operations’”). 
 124. Id. at 195. 
 125. See Fisch, supra note 13, at 1158 (describing the Eli Lilly no-action letter). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See, e.g., Stanton, supra note 108, at 991–92 (noting that the SEC bases its analysis 
on whether “the issue has either become or ceased being the subject of significant press 
attention, legislative debate, or public concern”). 
 129. 821 F. Supp. 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 130. Id. at 879. 
 131. Id. at 891. 
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The court’s reliance on evidence of congressional interest is at least as 
flawed as the reliance other courts have placed on media attention.  Among 
other things, the court failed to explain “why a matter of interest to 
Congress should ipso facto be an appropriate subject for shareholder 
voting.”132  As another commentator similarly observed: 
Even though the SEC staff attempts to substantiate [its decisions] by 
stating that there has been increased legislative interest in the particular 
area addressed by the proposal, it does not specify such interest.  Further, 
although legislative interest may be some evidence of the presence of a 
substantial policy issue, legislative interest alone does not sufficiently 
define the contours of a substantial policy issue.  The problem with 
equating “legislative interest” with “substantial policy issue” is that, even 
if we accept that legislative interest is evidence of a substantial policy 
issue, the question remains:  When does it become a substantial policy 
issue?  When a bill is introduced?  When it is passed by the House?  By 
the Senate?  When it is signed into law?133 
With tests such as these in use, it is no wonder that the ordinary business 
exclusion attracted a reputation for being opaque. 
C.  The Trinity Litigation 
Although the proponent in Trinity was not a hedge fund but rather a 
charity more typical of the original corporate social responsibility activists, 
the case provided an important test of Rule 14a-8(i)(7)’s ability—if any 
remained—to prevent shareholders from micromanaging corporations.  In 
2013, disturbed by the recent mass shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary 
School in nearby Connecticut, “Trinity resolved to use its investment 
portfolio to address the ease of access to rifles equipped with high-capacity 
magazines (the weapon of choice of the Sandy Hook shooter and other 
mass murderers).”134  Trinity chose Wal-Mart as its initial target.135  In 
reliance on Rule 14a-8, Trinity timely submitted the following proposal for 
inclusion in Wal-Mart’s 2014 annual proxy statement: 
Resolved: 
 Stockholders request that the Board amend the Compensation, 
Nominating and Governance Committee charter . . . as follows: 
 “27. Providing oversight concerning [and the public reporting of] the 
formulation and implementation of . . . policies and standards that 
determine whether or not the Company should sell a product that: 
 1) especially endangers public safety and well-being; 
 2) has the substantial potential to impair the reputation of the 
Company; and/or 
 
 132. Palmiter, supra note 19, at 882 n.13. 
 133. Kevin W. Waite, Note, The Ordinary Business Operations Exception to the 
Shareholder Proposal Rule:  A Return to Predictability, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1253, 1265 
(1995). 
 134. Trinity Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323, 328 (3d Cir.), cert. 
dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 499 (2015). 
 135. Id. 
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 3) would reasonably be considered by many offensive to the family 
and community values integral to the Company’s promotion of its 
brand.”136 
Wal-Mart notified the SEC that it intended to omit the proposal, relying 
on Rule 14a-8(i)(7).137  After evaluating Wal-Mart’s request and Trinity’s 
response thereto, the SEC staff issued a no-action letter on grounds “that the 
proposal relates to the products and services offered for sale by the 
company” and was therefore excludable under the ordinary business 
exception.138  Trinity then filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Delaware, seeking an injunction requiring Wal-Mart to include 
the proposal in its proxy statement for the upcoming annual meeting.139  
The district court granted the injunction, finding that the proposal was not 
subject to the exception because 
Trinity’s Proposal seeks to have Wal-Mart’s Board oversee the 
development and effectuation of a Wal-Mart policy.  While such a policy, 
if formulated and implemented, could (and almost certainly would) shape 
what products are sold by Wal-Mart, the Proposal does not itself have this 
consequence.  As Trinity acknowledges, the outcome of the Board’s 
deliberations regarding dangerous products is beyond the scope of the 
Proposal.  Any direct impact of adoption of Trinity’s Proposal would be 
felt at the Board level; it would then be for the Board to determine what, if 
any, policy should be formulated and implemented. 
. . . . 
 Moreover, to the extent the Proposal “relat[es] to such matters” as 
which products Wal-Mart may sell, the Proposal nonetheless “focus[es] 
on sufficiently significant social policy issues” as to not be excludable, 
because the Proposal “transcend[s] the day-to-day business matters and 
raise[s] policy issues so significant that it would be appropriate for a 
shareholder vote.”  The significant social policy issues on which the 
Proposal focuses include the social and community effects of sales of high 
capacity firearms at the world’s largest retailer and the impact this could 
have on Wal-Mart’s reputation, particularly if such a product sold at Wal-
Mart is misused and people are injured or killed as a result.  In this way, 
the Proposal implicates significant policy issues that are appropriate for a 
shareholder vote.140 
 
 136. Id. at 329–30.  At the time Trinity submitted its proposal, Wal-Mart had a policy of 
limiting, or, in some cases, even prohibiting sales of products management regarded as not 
being family friendly, such as music CDs and video games depicting sex or violence. See id. 
at 329.  The policy also limited the sale of handguns and high capacity rifle magazines when 
sold separately from a firearm. See id.  In Trinity’s view, this policy of “respect[ing] family 
and community interests” was inconsistently applied, because it did not extend to prohibiting 
the sale of rifles with high capacity magazines, which Trinity claimed “facilitate[s] mass 
killings.” Id. at 330.  
 137. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2014 WL 409085, at *1 (Jan. 30, 
2014). 
 138. Id. 
 139. See Trinity Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 3d 617 (D. Del. 2014), 
rev’d, 792 F.3d 323, cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 499. 
 140. Id. at 630–31 (alteration in original). 
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The Third Circuit reversed.141 
D.  The Trinity Standard 
In reversing the lower court’s decision, the Third Circuit stated that it 
was employing “a two-part analysis.”142  The test it adopted, however, is 
more accurately described as having three prongs.  First, the court must 
“discern the ‘subject matter’ of the proposal.”143  Second, the court asks 
whether the subject matter identified in the first step “relates” to ordinary 
business operations.144  Third, assuming a positive answer to the second 
question, the court must determine if the proposal nevertheless raises “a 
significant policy issue that transcends the nuts and bolts of the retailer’s 
business.”145  In turn, this third step encompasses two subsidiary inquiries:  
(1) does the proposal implicate a significant social issue or public policy 
and (2) does the proposal’s subject matter “transcend” the company’s 
ordinary business.146 
1.  Discerning the Subject Matter of the Proposal Under Trinity 
Although Trinity’s proposal made clear its opposition to firearms 
sales,147 Trinity claimed it was “not seeking to ‘determine what products 
should or should not be sold by the Company.’”148  Instead, Trinity asserted 
that the proposal was really about governance, as well as corporate 
standards and public safety,149 arguing that 
 1. [it] addresses corporate governance through Board oversight of 
important merchandising policies and is substantially removed from 
particularized decision-making in the ordinary course of business; 
 2. [it] concerns the Company’s standards for avoiding community 
harm while fostering public safety and corporate ethics and does not relate 
exclusively to any individual product; and 
 3. [it] raises substantial issues of public policy, namely a concern for 
the safety and welfare of the communities served by the Company’s 
stores.150 
Ultimately, the district court decided in Trinity’s favor, but the court 
acknowledged that the proposal “could (and almost certainly would) shape 
 
 141. Trinity, 792 F.3d at 324.  
 142. Id. at 341. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See id. at 345 (“We think the inquiry [under the third prong] is again best split into 
two steps.”). 
 147. See id. at 330 (“The narrative part of the proposal makes clear it is intended to cover 
Wal-Mart’s sale of certain firearms.”). 
 148. Id. at 331. 
 149. See id. at 329 (“Trinity drafted a shareholder proposal aimed at filling the 
governance gap it perceived.”). 
 150. Id. at 331 (alterations in original). 
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what products are sold by Wal-Mart.”151  Nevertheless, the district court 
deferred to Trinity’s extremely careful wording of the proposal, which 
requested action by the board—rather than management—and characterized 
the requested action as a board review of corporate policies rather than a 
specific decision.152 
In contrast, the Third Circuit refused to elevate form over substance, 
holding that the lower court’s approach would “allow drafters to evade Rule 
14a-8(i)(7)’s reach by styling their proposals as requesting board oversight 
or review.”153  Instead, the court held substance is to control over form, and 
“clever drafting” therefore cannot rescue an improper proposal.154  After 
separating the substantive wheat from the form chaff, the court must next 
determine the intended “ultimate consequence” of the proposal155: 
For us, the subject matter of Trinity’s proposal is how Wal-Mart 
approaches merchandising decisions involving products that (1) especially 
endanger public-safety and well-being, (2) have the potential to impair the 
reputation of the Company, and/or (3) would reasonably be considered by 
many offensive to the family and community values integral to the 
company’s promotion of the brand.  A contrary holding—that the 
proposal’s subject matter is “improved corporate governance”—would 
allow drafters to evade Rule 14a-8(i)(7)’s reach by styling their proposals 
as requesting board oversight or review.  We decline to go in that 
direction.156 
In so holding, the court wisely rejected the lower court’s ruling157 that a 
proposal falls outside the Rule 14a-8(i)(7) exclusion if it merely asks the 
board to develop a policy or review the application of extant policies to 
various products. 
Unfortunately, the Third Circuit’s approach lacks certainty and 
predictability.  In particular, it is not obvious how one determines the 
“ultimate consequence” of a proposal.158  As a result, despite the court’s 
repeated condemnation of “clever drafting,”159 the holding may simply 
encourage proponents to engage in increasingly clever efforts to obfuscate 
their intentions, while making it harder for firms to determine ex ante if the 
proposal will be excludable.160 
 
 151. Trinity Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 3d 617, 630 (D. Del. 2014), 
rev’d, 792 F.3d 323, cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 499. 
 152. See Trinity, 792 F.3d at 331 (“Trinity has carefully drafted its Proposal.”). 
 153. Id. at 344.  
 154. Id. at 341. 
 155. Id. at 342. 
 156. Id. at 344 (citation omitted). 
 157. See supra text accompanying note 140 (quoting district court opinion). 
 158. Trinity, 792 F.3d at 342. 
 159. Id. at 341 (emphasis omitted). 
 160. In evaluating the risk that Trinity will fail to end clever drafting from affecting the 
outcome of a proposal dispute, it seems probative that SEC no-action letters in this area have 
often reached inconsistent results that depend largely on minor semantic tweaks in the 
wording of the proposal in question. See Choi, supra note 46, at 177 (“SEC no-action letter 
decisions often appear to turn on semantic, not substantive, differences in shareholder 
proposals.”). 
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2.  Is the Identified Subject Matter One of Ordinary Business? 
In the second step, the court asks whether the subject matter identified in 
the first step “relates” to ordinary business operations.161  As the court read 
the rule, the word “relates” does considerable work:  “In short, so long as 
the subject matter of the proposal relates—that is, bears on—a company’s 
ordinary business operations, the proposal is excludable unless some other 
exception to the exclusion applies.”162  A proposal related to—or bearing 
on—the decision of which products the company should sell is thus 
excludable even if the “proposal doesn’t direct management to stop selling 
a particular product or prescribe a matrix to follow.”163  This step should 
prevent proponents from evading the ordinary business exclusion by careful 
wording of the proposal to avoid suggesting specific changes or 
recommending particular outcomes.164 
 
 161. Trinity, 792 F.3d at 341.   
 162. Id. at 344–45. 
 163. Id. at 344.  As the court further explained: 
A retailer’s approach to its product offerings is the bread and butter of its business.  
As amicus the National Association of Manufacturers notes, “Product selection is a 
complicated task influenced by economic trends, data analytics, demographics, 
customer preferences, supply chain flexibility, shipping costs and lead-times, and a 
host of other factors best left to companies’ management and boards of directors.”  
Though a retailer’s merchandising approach is not beyond shareholder 
comprehension, the particulars of that approach involve operational judgments that 
are ordinary-course matters. 
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Brief for the National Ass’n of Manufacturers as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Appellant at 12, Trinity, 792 F.3d 323 (No. 14-4764)); see also Brief of 
Amicus Curiae Retail Litigation Center, Inc. Supporting Appellant and Supporting Reversal 
at 11, Trinity, 792 F.3d 323 (No. 14-4764) (“The understanding of consumer behavior and 
careful tailoring of product mix is central to the success or failure of a given retailer.”).  
Indeed, even proposals bearing on strategic decisions relating to product line issues—such as 
a proposal that the company sell all or substantially all of the corporation’s assets—likely 
would be excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(7). See, e.g., Anchor Bancorp, Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter, 2013 WL 3535159, at *1 (July 11, 2013) (issuing a no-action letter where the 
issuer proposed to exclude a proposal to “maximize shareholder value, including, but not 
limited to a sale of the Company as a whole, merger or other transaction for all or 
substantially all of the assets of the Company”); Sears, Roebuck & Co., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 2000 WL 34223845, at *1 (Feb. 7, 2000) (issuing a no-action letter where the issuer 
proposed to exclude a proposal asking that the board retain an investment bank to “arrange 
for the sale of all or parts of the Company” because the proposal related to the company’s 
ordinary business operations); The Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 
WL 488472, at *1 (Aug. 18, 1998) (issuing a no-action letter where the issuer proposed to 
exclude a proposal asking that the board retain an investment bank to “evaluate the options 
for reorganization or divestment of any or all company assets as well as any strategic 
acquisitions”). 
 164. To be excludable, a proposal “need not dictate any particular outcome.” Trinity, 792 
F.3d at 344.  To drive the point home, the Trinity Court considered a hypothetical proposal 
that “merely asked Wal-Mart’s Board to reconsider whether to continue selling a given 
product.” Id.  Although a request so phrased “doesn’t dictate a particular outcome,” the court 
had “no doubt it would be excludable . . . even though it doesn’t suggest any changes.” Id. 
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3.  Evaluating the Proposal’s Social Significance 
As noted above,165 the Trinity Court split its third prong into two parts: 
The first is whether the proposal focuses on a significant policy (be it 
social or, as noted below, corporate).  If it doesn’t, the proposal fails to fit 
within the social-policy exception to Rule 14a-8(i)(7)’s exclusion.  If it 
does, we reach the second step and ask whether the significant policy 
issue transcends the company’s ordinary business operations.166 
The court quickly disposed of the first step—which we might call prong 
3.A—noting that “it is hard to counter that Trinity’s proposal doesn’t touch 
the bases of what are significant concerns in our society and corporations in 
that society.”167  Accordingly, the court held that the proposal raised a 
matter of sufficiently significant social and public policy concern to require 
that the court move on to the second step, which we might call prong 
3.B.168  Frustratingly, however, the relevant portion of the opinion contains 
no discussion of the policy issues raised by the proposal, let alone any 
explanation of why those concerns rose to the requisite level.  Although the 
court criticized the SEC for adopting “what can only be described as a ‘we-
know-it-when-we-see-it’ approach,”169 the court’s approach is no better.  
Instead, it simply asserted the proposal’s social significance by judicial fiat. 
The opinion thus provides future courts with no meaningful guidance on 
a critical but also highly opaque part of the analysis.  What metric should 
courts use to determine a proposal’s significance?  How does one determine 
whether the proposal’s significance is sufficient?  Put another way, 
assuming the court intended a baseball analogy, how many bases must the 
proposal touch?  The lack of guidance on these issues deprives the Trinity 
decision of much of its potential precedential value. 
Turning to prong 3.B, the court’s analysis is complex, convoluted, 
unhelpful, and unpersuasive.  First, as Judge Patty Shwartz’s concurring 
opinion cogently argued, the better view is that the social significance test is 
not a two-part test.170  Instead, a proposal becomes nonexcludable where its 
significance transcends the level of an ordinary business matter.171  Put 
 
 165. See supra text accompanying note 146 (discussing the third prong’s two-step 
standard). 
 166. Trinity, 792 F.3d at 345.  
 167. Id. at 346. 
 168. See id. (holding that “its proposal raises a matter of sufficiently significant policy”). 
 169. Id. 
 170. See id. at 353 (Shwartz, J., concurring) (arguing that “whether a proposal focuses on 
an issue of social policy that is sufficiently significant is not separate and distinct from 
whether the proposal transcends a company’s ordinary business”).  In a staff legal bulletin 
issued in response to the Trinity decision, the SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance stated 
that “the concurring judge analyzed Rule 14a-8(i)(7) in a manner consistent with the 
approach articulated by the Commission and applied by the Division.” SEC Staff Legal 
Bulletin No. 14H (CF), supra note 47, at *5.  The staff specifically rejected the majority’s 
holding that “a proposal’s focus [is] separate and distinct from whether a proposal transcends 
a company’s ordinary business.” Id. at *6. 
 171. See SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14(H) (CF), supra note 47, at *6 (arguing that “a 
proposal is sufficiently significant ‘because’ it transcends day-to-day business matters” 
(quoting Trinity, 792 F.3d at 353 (Shwartz, J., concurring))). 
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another way, transcendence is the metric—albeit a highly opaque one—by 
which the significance of the proposal is to be measured. 
Second, the court’s analysis wholly failed to draw a bright line between 
which proposals may be excluded and which may not.  According to the 
court, “a shareholder must do more than focus its proposal on a significant 
policy issue; the subject matter of its proposal must ‘transcend’ the 
company’s ordinary business.”172  This is so, the court explained, because 
the “transcendence requirement plays a pivotal role in the social-policy 
exception calculus.  Without it shareholders would be free to submit 
‘proposals dealing with ordinary business matters yet cabined in social 
policy concern.’”173 
Perhaps so, but this is analysis by epithet and reasoning by pejorative, 
rather than coherent legal argument.  “Transcend” is undefined in the 
opinion.174  Instead, the court contrasts a proposal that is not excludable 
because it transcends the company’s ordinary business with one that is 
excludable because it is “enmeshed with the way it runs its business and the 
retailer-consumer interaction.”175  Unfortunately, the court also failed to 
define “enmeshed.”  The mental images invoked by the dictionary 
definition—“[t]o mesh; to tangle or interweave in such a manner as not to 
be easily separated, particularly in a mesh or net like manner”—are 
singularly unhelpful.176  The same is true of the dictionary definition of 
transcend, which is “to pass beyond the limits of something.”177 
Instead of stating a rule or defining a standard, the court simply offers up 
labels with no guidance as to when and how they should be applied in 
specific future cases.  This is problematic because, as scholars have 
observed of the use of analysis by epithet in the context of contract 
interpretation, “[a] court’s focus on labels rather than on reasoning not only 
impedes law students’ understanding of what the law is and how to answer 
questions on an exam, but also lawyers’ understanding of how to advise 
clients and how to present arguments to arbitrators and judges.”178 
To be sure, the court offered up several examples of hypothetical 
proposals that either transcend or are enmeshed with the hypothesized 
companies’ businesses.179  But these too are unhelpful.  For example, the 
court stated: 
 
 172. Trinity, 792 F.3d at 346–47. 
 173. Id. at 347 (quoting Apache Corp. v. N.Y.C. Emps. Ret. Sys., 621 F. Supp. 2d 444, 
451 n.7 (S.D. Tex. 2008)). 
 174. A words and phrases search for the term in Westlaw’s main case database proved 
unavailing, as did a search of Black’s Law Dictionary. 
 175. Trinity, 792 F.3d at 350. 
 176. Enmesh, WIKTIONARY, https://en.wiktionary.org/w/index.php?title=enmesh&oldid= 
35612368 (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/H9T6-3RDW]. 
 177. Transcend, WIKTIONARY, https://en.wiktionary.org/w/index.php?title=transcend& 
oldid=33848621 (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/SPX8-A9BY]. 
 178. David G. Epstein et al., Extrinsic Evidence, Parol Evidence, and the Parol Evidence 
Rule:  A Call for Courts to Use the Reasoning of the Restatements Rather Than the Rhetoric 
of Common Law, 44 N.M. L. REV. 49, 86 (2014). 
 179. See Trinity, 792 F.3d at 347–50 (offering illustrations of its argument). 
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 To illustrate the distinction, a proposal that asks a supermarket chain to 
evaluate its sale of sugary sodas because of the effect on childhood 
obesity should be excludable because, although the proposal raises a 
significant social policy issue, the request is too entwined with the 
fundamentals of the daily activities of a supermarket running its business:  
deciding which food products will occupy its shelves.  So too would a 
proposal that, out of concern for animal welfare, aims to limit which food 
items a grocer sells.180 
The court’s example is flawed for a number of reasons.  First, the 
reference to a proposal motivated by concern for animal welfare is 
inconsistent with the leading precedent of Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, 
Ltd.,181 which held that a proposal asking a food importer to “to study the 
methods by which its French supplier produces pâté de foie gras,” had 
ethical and social significance.182  This inconsistency further undermines 
Trinity’s utility as precedent. 
Second, consider a variation on the court’s main hypothetical in which a 
similar proposal is submitted to a manufacturer of “sugary sodas.”  Would 
such a proposal also be excludable?  The court implied that it would not 
allow the latter proposal to be excluded, observing that “[a] policy matter 
relating to a product is far more likely to transcend a company’s ordinary 
business operations when the product is that of a manufacturer with a 
narrow line.”183  But if selling sugary sodas is ordinary business, should not 
making them be so as well?  Indeed, the case for exclusion would seem 
stronger as the company’s line of business narrows.  After all, choosing a 
company’s principal line of business is a core responsibility of the board of 
directors and not something in which shareholders normally have a 
voice.184 
In sum, the Third Circuit reached the right result.  It also properly 
condemned efforts like Trinity’s to end-run the ordinary business exclusion 
 
 180. Id. at 347. 
 181. 618 F. Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1985). 
 182. Id. at 556.  Although Lovenheim was decided under the exemption for economically 
insignificant proposals now recognized as Rule 14a-8(i)(5), there is substantial overlap 
between the standards under that exception and the exclusion for ordinary business matters. 
See 3E HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, Shareholder Proposals Raising Social, 
Ethical or Policy Issues—Medical Committee Legacy, in SECURITIES & FEDERAL CORPORATE 
LAW § 24:86 (2d ed. 2016) (“The Rule 14a-8(i)(5) exclusion for proposals not significantly 
related to registrant’s business and the Rule 14a-8(i)(7) exclusion for proposals relating to 
‘ordinary business operations’ are inextricably bound together . . . .”). 
 183. Trinity, 792 F.3d at 349. 
 184. See Troy A. Paredes, The Firm and the Nature of Control:  Toward a Theory of 
Takeover Law, 29 J. CORP. L. 103, 162 (2003) (noting that an “ordinary business decision, 
such as whether or not to build a new factory or enter into a new line of business, . . . falls 
squarely within the board’s control”).  Moreover, as the Washington Legal Foundation’s 
amicus brief argued, “proposals concerning a company’s assessment of the risks and benefits 
of aspects of its business operations do not raise significant policy issues . . . but instead 
delve into the ordinary conduct of business.” Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellant, Urging Reversal at 7–8, Trinity, 792 F.3d 
323 (No. 14-4764).  This is true even when assessing the risks and benefits of continuing to 
make a single product. 
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via clever wording.  In getting there, however, the court announced a test 
that lacks administrability, predictability, and certainty. 
III.  A BETTER TEST 
The Trinity Court was aware that a better test is needed: 
 Although a core business of courts is to interpret statutes and rules, our 
job is made difficult where agencies, after notice and comment, have 
hard-to-define exclusions to their rules and exceptions to those 
exclusions.  For those who labor with the ordinary business exclusion and 
a social-policy exception that requires not only significance but 
“transcendence,” we empathize.  Despite the substantial uptick in 
proposals attempting to raise social policy issues that bat down the 
business operations bar, the SEC’s last word on the subject came in the 
1990s, and we have no hint that any change from it or Congress is 
forthcoming. . . . 
 . . . We thus suggest that [the SEC] consider revising its regulation of 
proxy contests and issue fresh interpretive guidance.185 
The court’s unwillingness to undertake the task of developing a better 
standard apparently stemmed from its belief that the SEC is entitled to 
Chevron deference in this area.186  Before setting out an alternative 
proposal, it is worth briefly addressing the question of whether the SEC is 
in fact deserving of deference in this area. 
A.  Chevron 
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,187 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that, where congressional intent is unclear, a 
reviewing court should defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute so 
long as it constitutes a permissible construction of the statute.188  In light of 
the remarkably limited and unhelpful legislative history of section 14(a) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,189 SEC actions in this area would 
seem plausible candidates for Chevron deference.  In fact, however, courts 
have frequently declined to defer to SEC interpretations of Rule 14a-8, 
especially with respect to the ordinary business exclusion.190 
 
 185. Trinity, 792 F.3d at 351. 
 186. See id. at 337 n.9 (“Each of the SEC’s interpretive releases was adopted after notice 
and comment and thus merits our deference.”). 
 187. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 188. Id. at 842–43. 
 189. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19C-4, 69 
WASH. U. L.Q. 565, 607–08 (1991) (“The legislative history of section 14(a) is relatively 
sparse, in large part because the controversy over federal proxy regulation was resolved early 
in the legislative process.”). 
 190. See Nagy, supra note 89, at 980 (citing opinions in which courts declined to give 
Chevron deference “where the regulatory ambiguity at issue involved SEC Rule 14a-8”); see 
also supra notes 111–15 and accompanying text (noting cases in which courts declined to 
defer to the SEC on Rule 14a-8 issues). 
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The basic problem is that the SEC and its staff have consistently failed to 
apply the ordinary business exclusion consistently.191  Worse yet, the SEC 
often has failed to justify its interpretative flip-flops.192  As the Supreme 
Court has recognized, albeit in a different context, this sort of unexplained 
inconsistency renders Chevron deference inappropriate.193 
B.  Substance over Form 
As with the Trinity decision, my proposal is premised on the notion that 
substance should prevail over form.194  In particular, I endorse the court’s 
refusal to allow shareholders to evade the ordinary business exclusion by 
requesting a report on a subject or asking the issuer’s board of directors to 
review the subject.195  Put another way, the mere fact that a proposal asks 
the board for a report on, or a review of, some matter should not prevent the 
proposal from being excluded if the subject matter of the report remains one 
of ordinary business.196 
 
 191. See Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 821 
F. Supp. 877, 886 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (recognizing that the SEC’s “treatment of these proposals 
has changed over time”); see also Palmiter, supra note 19, at 882 (observing that “the 
agency’s interpretive flip-flops in no-action letters have become legion”); Waite, supra note 
133, at 1265 (“The SEC and its staff, while attempting to apply the two-part test, has many 
times reversed its position on a given issue . . . .”). 
 192. See Palmiter, supra note 19, at 909 (“Why matters once improper for shareholder 
dialogue became proper overnight, or once proper became improper, the SEC and its staff 
have failed to explain.”); Waite, supra note 133, at 1265 (noting that the SEC has often 
switched positions “without giving any strong support for its choice to do so”). 
 193. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 
(2005) (holding that an “unexplained inconsistency is . . . a reason for holding an 
interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice”).  Although the 
issue is beyond the scope of this Article, I also note in passing that the Supreme Court 
appears to be gradually abandoning—or at least undermining—Chevron. See, e.g., Michael 
Herz, Chevron Is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1868 (2015) 
(observing that “reports of Chevron’s death seemed to get significant confirmation at the end 
of the Supreme Court’s 2014–2015 Term, when the Court decided three important cases that 
suggested that Chevron’s condition was, if not terminal, at least serious”); Caroline E. Keen, 
Clarifying What Is “Clear”:  Reconsidering Whistleblower Protections Under Dodd-Frank, 
19 N.C. BANKING INST. 215, 230 (2015) (“An emerging trend in regulatory interpretation 
involves the courts willingness to abandon the key principles of Chevron, thereby shifting 
the focus from a search for congressional intent to one of textual clarity.”). 
 194. See supra text accompanying note 154 (noting the Trinity Court’s discussion of the 
substance versus form issue). 
 195. See Trinity Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323, 342 (3d Cir.) (noting 
that “under Trinity’s position, the subject matter of a proposal that calls for a report on how a 
restaurant chain’s menu promotes sound dietary habits would be corporate governance as 
opposed to important matters involving the promotion of public health”), cert. dismissed, 
136 S. Ct. 499 (2015). 
 196. As the D.C. Circuit has observed: 
  For a time, the Commission staff “ha[d] taken the position that proposals 
requesting issuers to prepare reports on specific aspects of their business or to form 
[study committees] would not be excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(7).”  The 
Commission has changed that position.  Pointing out that the staff’s interpretation 
“raise[d] form over substance,” the Commission instructed the staff to “consider 
whether the subject matter of the [requested] report or [study] committee involves 
a matter of ordinary business:  where it does, the proposal [is] excludable under 
Rule 14a-8(c)(7).” 
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To be sure, although allowing exclusion of proposals requesting a review 
or report captures much of the low hanging fruit, in some cases the task of 
discerning the proposal’s true goals will introduce an element of uncertainty 
to the administration of the exclusion.197  Yet, doing so is critical if the 
exclusion is to have real teeth.  Otherwise, proponents could avoid it simply 
by clever drafting.  Courts therefore must look beyond the wording of the 
proposal—and, in appropriate cases, the four corners thereof—to determine 
whether the intent of the proposal is to affect the way in which the company 
conducts matters of ordinary business. 
C.  Modifying the Social and Policy Significance 
Carve Out 
The exemption for matters of social and ethical significance from the 
exclusionary provisions of Rules 14a-8(i)(5) and 14a-8(i)(7) has long been 
controversial.  For one thing, “shareholders’ social policy proposals 
[occasionally] require a company to include speech in its proxy statements 
that appears directly adverse to the company’s interests.”198  Setting aside 
the issue of whether it is sound securities regulation policy to require a 
corporation to include statements adverse to its interests in its disclosure 
documents, forcing the corporation to do so implicates the First 
Amendment rights of both the corporation and its shareholders.199  In 
effect, the Rule forces shareholders to subsidize speech that may reduce the 
value of their investments.200  This remains true despite the shift toward 
hedge fund activism, as I have observed elsewhere: 
[W]hile there is considerable evidence for the proposition that activist 
shareholders can profit through private rent-seeking, there is little 
evidence that activism has benefits for investors as a class.  Navigant 
Consulting recently undertook a review of the most basic form of 
shareholder activism—Rule 14a-8 proposals—and found no evidence that 
 
  We need not linger over the report issue.  The staff’s no-action letters in this 
respect are unremarkable and entirely in keeping with current practice. 
Roosevelt v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416, 428 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (alterations 
in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 
20,091, 48 Fed. Reg. 38,218, 38,221 (Aug. 23, 1983)). 
 197. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of guidance on this 
point provided by the opinion). 
 198. Antony Page, Taking Stock of the First Amendment’s Application to Securities 
Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REV. 789, 804 (2007). 
 199. Cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech:  Who 
Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 113 (2010) (arguing that shareholders have a “First 
Amendment interest in not being forced to be associated with political speech that they do 
not support”). 
 200. See Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate 
Democracy, 23 GA. L. REV. 97, 121 (1988) (observing that “corporate assets are being spent 
to subsidize corporate internal debate on proposals that never will be adopted”). 
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it resulted in either short or long-term increases in market value.  This was 
true of both social and governance proposals.201 
Courts therefore should ask whether a reasonable shareholder of an issuer 
would regard a proposal as having material economic importance for the 
value of his shares.  This standard is based on the well-established securities 
law principle of materiality.202  It is intended to exclude proposals made 
primarily for the purpose of promoting general social and political causes, 
while requiring inclusion of proposals a reasonable investor would believe 
are relevant to the value of his investment.  Such a test seems desirable to 
ensure that an adopted proposal redounds to the benefit of all shareholders, 
not just those who share the political and social views of the proponent.  
Absent such a standard, as we have seen, the Shareholder Proposal Rule 
becomes nothing less than a species of private eminent domain by which 
the federal government allows a small minority to appropriate someone 
else’s property.  The company is a legal person,203 after all, and it is the 
company’s proxy statement at issue, which the minority is attempting to use 
as a soapbox to disseminate its views.  Because the shareholders hold the 
residual claim,204 and all corporate expenditures thus come out of their 
pocket, it is not entirely clear why other shareholders should have to 
subsidize speech by a small minority.205 
D.  Two-Prong Proposal 
Both the SEC and the courts have rarely looked to state law to determine 
what constitutes ordinary business, instead developing what amounts to a 
federal common law standard.206  By failing to do so, however, they have 
fundamentally departed from the basic principles that animate Rule 14a-8.  
As adopted, Rule 14a-8 was not intended to create any new substantive 
rights, but only to make effective a right to ballot access that the SEC 
believed existed under state law.207  This is equally true of the ordinary 
 
 201. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
252 (2012). 
 202. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (“An omitted fact 
is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it 
important in deciding how to vote.”). 
 203. See Metro. Life Ins. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881 n.9 (1985) (“It is well established 
that a corporation is a ‘person’ within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 204. See Ashby, supra note 59, at 535 (observing that “shareholders own the residual 
claim to the company’s earnings and assets”). 
 205. See Palmiter, supra note 19, at 886 (“By shifting the proposing shareholder’s 
solicitation costs to the company, the rule compels the body of shareholders to subsidize 
self-appointed corporate reformers.”). 
 206. See Brown, supra note 46, at 510 (“Disconnected from state law and devoid of any 
real standards, application of the ‘ordinary business’ exclusion developed in an ad hoc and 
inconsistent fashion that could result in tenuous determinations.”); Uhlenbrock, supra note 
45, at 307 (positing that “the SEC will continue to formulate its ‘common law’ definition of 
the scope of the ordinary business operations exception through no-action letters”). 
 207. See Fisch, supra note 13, at 1144 (explaining that “state law rather than the federal 
proxy rules was to define the substantive relationship between shareholder and management 
in governing the corporation”); Milton V. Freeman, An Estimate of the Practical 
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business exclusion itself, which follows directly from the limits on 
shareholder power imposed by state law.208 
Drawing on state law to determine what constitutes ordinary business for 
purposes of Rule 14a-8 is consistent with—if not mandated by—the line 
between federal and state law drawn by Business Roundtable v. SEC,209 the 
leading case on federalism in corporate law.210  In that case, the D.C. 
Circuit drew a distinction between full disclosure and fair solicitation 
procedures, and substantive shareholder rights.211  Because the SEC rule in 
question in that case “directly interfere[d] with the substance of what the 
shareholders may enact,” the D.C. Circuit held the rule was invalid as 
beyond the SEC’s authority to adopt.212 
As I have recognized elsewhere, Rule 14a-8 in general is likely a valid 
exercise of SEC authority, because “absent the rule, shareholders have no 
practical means of holding management accountable through the voting 
process or even affecting the agenda.  As such, it too may be supportable 
‘as a control over management’s power to set the voting agenda.’”213  The 
ordinary business exclusion, however, goes neither to substance or 
procedure.  Instead, it speaks to “the distribution of powers among the 
various players in the process of corporate governance,” which Business 
Roundtable teaches is properly the subject of state rather than federal 
law.214  Accordingly, the validity of subsection 14a-8(i)(7) depends on 
using state law to define the meaning and scope of ordinary business. 
State law provides two standards by which to determine which proposals 
impinge on ordinary business matters.  First, state law draws a distinction 
 
Consequences of the Stockholder’s Proposal Rule, 34 U. DET. L.J. 549, 549 (1957) (stating 
that the rule “is merely a recognition of rights granted by state law”). 
 208. See Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 821 
F. Supp. 877, 882–83 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (“A shareholder proposal pertaining to ‘ordinary 
business operations’ would be improper if raised at an annual meeting, because the law of 
most states (including Delaware) leaves the conduct of ordinary business operations to 
corporate directors and officers rather than the shareholders.”). 
 209. 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 210. See, e.g., Philip C. Berg, The Limits of SEC Authority Under Section 14(a) of the 
Exchange Act:  Where Federal Disclosure Ends and State Corporate Governance Begins, 17 
J. CORP. L. 311, 329 (1992) (“Until Business Roundtable . . . it had remained unclear whether 
this federalism had any teeth.  The D.C. Circuit makes clear that it does, and that the SEC’s 
statutory mandate does not allow it to regulate corporate governance absent specific 
authorization from Congress to that effect.”); Roberta S. Karmel, The Securities and 
Exchange Commission Goes Abroad to Regulate Corporate Governance, 33 STETSON L. 
REV. 849, 852 (2004). 
  In another important precedent concerning the SEC’s power to regulate 
corporate governance, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia, in Business Roundtable v. SEC, invalidated a voting-rights rule adopted 
by the SEC on the ground that ‘the rule directly [controlled] the substantive 
allocation of powers among classes of shareholders,’ and therefore, ‘it [was] in 
excess of the [SEC’s] authority under [Section] 19 of the [Exchange Act]. 
Id. at 852 (alterations in original).  
 211. See Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 411 (describing the “murky area between 
substance and procedure”). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Bainbridge, supra note 189, at 622. 
 214. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 412. 
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between those matters that are the proper subject of shareholder 
amendments to the corporation’s bylaws and those that are beyond the 
shareholders’ power to adopt.  As an important doctrinal line of separation 
between what is in the power of the board of directors and that of the 
shareholders, this body of law is relevant by way of analogy.  In addition, 
however, shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8 increasingly take the 
form of proposed amendments to the bylaws.  As such, this body of law is 
directly relevant to the problem at hand.  Second, state law draws a 
distinction between ordinary and extraordinary actions for purposes of 
determining what actions must be taken by the board of directors rather 
than corporate managers.  While not precisely on point, this distinction 
provides a logical analogy for this purpose. 
1.  The Bylaw Analogy 
In CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan,215 AFSCME’s pension 
plan put forward a shareholder proposal to amend CA’s bylaws to provide 
that the corporation would be obliged to reimburse the reasonable expenses 
of a shareholder who successfully conducted a short slate proxy contest.216  
CA notified the SEC of its intention to omit the proposal from its proxy 
statement and requested an SEC no-action letter supporting exclusion.217 
In response, the SEC invoked a unique Delaware constitutional provision 
that authorizes the SEC to certify questions of law to the Delaware Supreme 
Court.218  The SEC certified two questions:  (1) was AFSCME’s proposal a 
proper subject for shareholder action under Delaware law and (2) would the 
proposal, if adopted, cause CA to violate any Delaware law?219 
In answering the first of those questions, the court stated it was unable to 
draw a bright line of general applicability between permissible and 
impermissible bylaws.220  In analyzing the specific bylaw in question, 
however, the court stressed the broad statutory grant of managerial power to 
the board of directors and the absence of any such power on the part of 
shareholders: 
8 Del. C. § 141(a) . . . pertinently provides that: 
 
 215. 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008). 
 216. See id. at 229–30 (setting out the text of the proposal). 
 217. See id. at 230. 
 218. See id. at 229 (“This proceeding arises from a certification by the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission (the ‘SEC’), to this Court, of two questions of law 
pursuant to Article IV, Section 11(8) of the Delaware Constitution and Supreme Court Rule 
41.” (footnote omitted)); see also Junis L. Baldon, Taking a Backseat:  How Delaware Can 
Alter the Role of the SEC in Evaluating Shareholder Proposals, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. 
L.J. 101 (2009) (discussing the Delaware provision allowing certification by the SEC of 
questions to the Delaware Supreme Court). 
 219. See CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 231 (setting out the text of the certified questions). 
 220. See id. at 234 (stating that Delaware precedents did not permit the court to 
“articulate with doctrinal exactitude a bright-line that divides those bylaws that shareholders 
may unilaterally adopt under Section 109(b) from those which they may not under Section 
141(a)”). 
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 The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this 
chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, 
except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of 
incorporation. 
 No such broad management power is statutorily allocated to the 
shareholders.  Indeed, it is well-established that stockholders of a 
corporation subject to the DGCL may not directly manage the business 
and affairs of the corporation, at least without specific authorization in 
either the statute or the certificate of incorporation.221 
Accordingly, the court limited shareholder power over bylaws by holding 
that the “proper function of bylaws is not to mandate how the board should 
decide specific substantive business decisions, but rather, to define the 
process and procedures by which those decisions are made.”222 
As I have noted elsewhere: 
This distinction between substance (disallowed) and process (allowed) 
captures an appropriate balance between authority and accountability.  If 
shareholder interventions directed at substantive decisions can be 
discouraged, the board’s decision-making authority is respected.  Indeed, 
if it is the case—as seems likely—that private rent seeking most often will 
take the form of substantive interventions, discouraging that category of 
interventions provides a useful prophylactic solution to the rent-seeking 
problem.  Conversely, process and procedural interventions do not 
deprive the board of its authority but rather can be used to ensure that that 
authority is used accountably.223 
Incorporating the state test for valid bylaws into the ordinary business 
exclusion thus advances a core policy goal of drawing the appropriate 
balance between shareholder and director power.  In addition, by 
incorporating the state standard, federal courts would also limit the ability 
of shareholders to end-run the other restrictions on micromanagement by 
using shareholder proposals to advance amendments to the bylaws.  Only 
bylaws valid under state law would be exempt from exclusion as ordinary 
business matters, thereby reinforcing the ability of Rule 14a-8(i)(1) to keep 
such bylaw amendments off the proxy statement.  Finally, the 
substance/procedure dichotomy echoes the Business Roundtable holding 
that the substance of shareholder rights is left to state law and the 
procedures by which they vote is determined by federal law. 
2.  The Ordinary Versus Extraordinary Matter Analogy 
The disconnect between the current judicial definition of ordinary 
business under Rule 14a-8(i)(7) and state law is sometimes justified on 
grounds that state law fails to define the term.224  Yet, in fact, there is a 
 
 221. Id. at 232 (footnotes omitted). 
 222. Id. at 234–35. 
 223. Bainbridge, supra note 97, at 245.  
 224. See, e.g., 1982 Proposing Release, supra note 102, at 47,429 (“State law 
precedent . . . is rarely conclusive as to what is or is not ordinary business, and the staff 
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well-established body of state law precedents that offer guidance on which 
the SEC and courts easily could rely.  Specifically, I propose that the Rule 
14a-8(i)(7) definition of ordinary business incorporate the extensive body of 
state law dealing with the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary 
actions for purposes of determining the scope of the apparent authority of 
corporate officers. 
As agents of the corporation, senior managers have broad authority—
both actual and apparent—to act on behalf of the corporation.225  A well-
established line of cases, however, limits the implied and apparent authority 
of corporate officers to matters arising in the ordinary course of business.  
In the leading decision of Lee v. Jenkins Bros.,226 the Second Circuit held 
“that the president [of a corporation] only has authority to bind his company 
by acts arising in the usual and regular course of business but not for 
contracts of an ‘extraordinary’ nature.”227 
In general, acts consigned by statute to the board of directors will be 
deemed extraordinary.228  Likewise, acts that boards as a whole may not 
delegate to board committees “would normally not be within the authority 
of the president or other senior executives.”229  So are acts that would 
require shareholder approval.230  In addition, many specific actions that by 
statute require neither board nor shareholder action have been identified as 
extraordinary.231  Conversely, there is a substantial number of precedents 
 
generally has had to make its own determination as to whether a proposal involves an 
activity relating to the issuer’s ordinary business.”). 
 225. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“The 
elements of common-law agency are present in the relationships between . . . corporation 
and officer . . . .”). 
 226. 268 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1959). 
 227. Id. at 365; see also In re Mulco Prods., Inc., 123 A.2d 95, 104 (Del. Super. Ct. 1956) 
(stating that “it is held generally that the General Manager of a corporation entrusted with 
the entire management and control of its business has implied power to borrow money for 
the legitimate purpose of the corporation in its current and usual business”); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.03 cmt. e(3) (“The apparent authority of a president or chief 
executive officer encompasses transactions falling within the ordinary course of the 
corporation’s business.”). 
 228. See, e.g., Plant v. White River Lumber Co., 76 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1935) (deeming 
the sale of all or substantially all corporate assets extraordinary). 
 229. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE:  ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.01 (1994). 
 230. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.03 cmt. e(3). 
 231. See, e.g., In re Lee Ready Mix & Supply Co., 437 F.2d 497 (6th Cir. 1971) 
(mortgaging assets); Maple Island Farm, Inc. v. Bitterling, 209 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1954) 
(lifetime employment contract); Abraham Lincoln Life Ins. v. Hopwood, 81 F.2d 284 (6th 
Cir. 1936) (contract to effectuate a merger); Comput. Maint. Corp. v. Tilley, 322 S.E.2d 533 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (shareholder buy-sell agreement); First Nat’l Bank v. Cement Prods. 
Co., 227 N.W. 908 (Iowa 1929) (guaranteeing debt of another firm); Ney v. E. Iowa Tel. 
Co., 144 N.W. 383 (Iowa 1913) (initiating a lawsuit against the corporation’s largest 
shareholder); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Murray, 84 A.2d 870 (Md. 1951) (lifetime 
employment contract); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Foil, 202 S.E.2d 591 (N.C. 1974) 
(guaranteeing another firm’s debts); Daniel Webster Council, Inc. v. St. James Ass’n, 533 
A.2d 329 (N.H. 1987) (land sales contract); Myrtle Ave. Corp. v. Mt. Prospect Bldg. & Loan 
Ass’n, 169 A. 707 (N.J. 1934) (postponing mortgage foreclosure); Brown v. Grayson 
Enters., Inc., 401 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (making a lifetime employment 
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deeming specific actions to be within the ordinary business of the 
corporation.232  Taken together, these lines of cases provide a database on 
which Rule 14a-8(i)(7) issues could be resolved. 
In addition, state law provides guidance for resolving issues as to which 
there is no binding precedent: 
[A]mong the elements to be taken into account for purposes of 
determining what constitutes an “extraordinary” action, which would 
normally be outside the apparent authority of senior executives, are the 
economic magnitude of the action in relation to corporate assets and 
earnings, the extent of risk involved, the time span of the action’s effect, 
and the cost of reversing the action.  Examples of the kinds of actions that 
would normally be “extraordinary” include the creation or retirement of 
long-term or other significant debt, the reacquisition of significant 
amounts of equity, significant capital investments, business combinations 
including those effected for cash, the disposition of significant businesses, 
entry into important new lines of business, significant acquisitions of 
stock in other corporations, and actions that would foreseeably expose the 
corporation to significant litigation or significant new regulatory 
problems.  A useful generalization is that decisions that would make a 
significant change in the structure of the business enterprise, or the 
structure of control over the enterprise, are extraordinary corporate 
actions, and therefore are normally outside the apparent authority of 
senior executives.233 
Admittedly, I am proposing a standard rather than a bright-line rule, so 
the SEC staff still would be required to make determinations in specific 
cases.  Moreover, there is an unfortunate degree of inconsistency from state 
to state as to which actions are deemed extraordinary and which are deemed 
ordinary.  States are divided, for example, as to whether such basic matters 
as filing a lawsuit234 or executing a guarantee of another corporation’s debts 
are ordinary or extraordinary.235 
 
contract); Lloydona Peters Enters., Inc. v. Dorius, 658 P.2d 1209 (Utah 1983) (initiating 
litigation). 
 232. See, e.g., Lee, 268 F.2d 357 (hiring or firing employees and fixing their 
compensation and benefits); United Producers and Consumers Coop. v. Held, 225 F.2d 615 
(9th Cir. 1955) (discussing the same); Custer Channel Wing Corp. v. Frazer, 181 F. Supp. 
197 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (initiating a lawsuit); Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n of Stanislaus Cty. v. Pac. 
Grape Prods. Co., 290 P.2d 481 (Cal. 1955) (making a charitable pledge); In re Mulco Prod., 
Inc., 123 A.2d 95 (executing a promissory note); Quigley v. W.N. MacQueen & Co., 321 Ill. 
124 (1926) (corporation would repurchase stock from shareholder at latter’s option); Sperti 
Prods., Inc. v. Container Corp. of Am., 481 S.W.2d 43 (Ky. Ct. App. 1972) (executing a 
guarantee of another firm’s debts); Emperee v. Meyers, 269 A.2d 731 (Pa. 1970) (executing 
a note for benefit of prospective employee). 
 233. AM. LAW. INST., supra note 229, § 3.01 reporter’s note. 
 234. Compare Custer, 181 F. Supp. 197 (holding that the corporation’s president had 
authority to do so), with Lloydona, 658 P.2d 1209 (holding that the corporation’s president 
had no authority to do so). 
 235. Compare Sperti Prods., 481 S.W.2d 43 (holding that the corporation’s president had 
authority to do so), with First Nat’l Bank, 227 N.W. 908 (holding that the corporation’s 
president had no authority to do so). 
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Yet, as we have seen,236 the SEC staff in some cases already must make 
what it calls “reasoned distinctions” that even the SEC admits are 
“somewhat tenuous.”237  Unlike my proposal, moreover, the staff currently 
makes those distinctions in an inconsistent manner that is divorced from the 
state law principles that are supposed to undergird the shareholder proposal 
regime.238  My proposal provides both specific precedents and a state-law-
based standard for resolving cases where there are no binding state law 
precedents. 
As for the problem of state-to-state inconsistency, there is a solution at 
hand; namely, the internal affairs doctrine, which “is a conflict of laws 
principle which recognizes that only one State should have the authority to 
regulate a corporation’s internal affairs—matters peculiar to the 
relationships among or between the corporation and its current officers, 
directors, and shareholders.”239  Accordingly, when presented with a no-
action letter relying on Rule 14a-8(i)(7), the SEC staff should simply look 
to the law of the state of incorporation.  The SEC staff’s interpretative 
burden is further alleviated because over half of all public corporations are 
incorporated in Delaware.240  Delaware law permits the SEC to certify 
questions of law to the Delaware Supreme Court for determination.241  
Finally, express adoption of this standard by the SEC might encourage 
states to develop a more consistent application of the ordinary business 
question. 
To be sure, my proposal is similar to one previously rejected by the SEC.  
As the Trinity court observed, “the SEC in its 1976 Adopting Release 
rejected the proposed bright line whereby shareholder proposals involving 
‘matters that would be handled by management personnel without referral 
to the board . . . generally would be excludable,’ but those involving 
‘matters that would require action by the board would not be.’”242  As we 
have seen, however, the SEC’s rejection of such a proposal should not 
receive Chevron deference.243  In addition, the SEC rejected the 1976 
proposal on grounds that it was administratively infeasible because state 
law purportedly does not provide adequate guidance as to which matters are 
limited to the board.244  As discussed above, however, I believe state law in 
fact does provide relevant guidance. 
 
 236. See supra notes 206–08 and accompanying text (discussing the SEC staff’s 
development of a federal common law definition of ordinary business). 
 237. See Trinity Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323, 340 (3d Cir.) (quoting 
1998 Adopting Release, supra note 116), cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 499 (2015). 
 238. See supra notes 46, 206–08 and accompanying text (discussing the staff’s 
inconsistency in applying the ordinary business exclusion and the staff’s failure to rely on 
state law, respectively). 
 239. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982). 
 240. See Omari Scott Simmons, Delaware’s Global Threat, 41 J. CORP. L. 217, 264 
(2015). 
 241. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 229 n.1 (Del. 2008). 
 242. Trinity, 792 F.3d at 342.  
 243. See supra Part III.A (discussing application of Chevron to SEC actions in this 
context). 
 244. See Waite, supra note 133, at 1263 (discussing the 1976 proposal). 
742 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
3.  Application 
State law provides workable standards by which to determine what 
constitutes ordinary business matters for purposes of Rule 14a-8(i)(7).  
Either standard, standing alone, would be a significant improvement on 
current law in terms of fidelity to core federalism principles and 
administrability.  In my view, however, the two standards would work well 
in concert.  Courts should determine whether a proposal goes to substance 
or procedure, because that distinction goes to the core division between the 
powers of the board and those of the shareholders.  This is not enough, 
however, because proposals cast as procedural initiatives could still 
impinge on how decisions relating to ordinary substantive matters are made.  
Accordingly, courts should also assess whether the subject matter of the 
proposal falls within the relevant state law definition of an ordinary 
business matter. 
CONCLUSION 
In Trinity, the Third Circuit reached the right result.  It also properly 
condemned efforts like Trinity’s to end-run the ordinary business exclusion 
via clever wording.  In getting there, however, the court announced a test 
that lacks administrability, predictability, and certainty.  The court’s test is 
further problematic because it is inconsistent with the relevant federalism 
principles that allocate authority to the states over the substance of what 
shareholders may decide.  In contrast, my proposal is squarely rooted in the 
relevant principles of state corporate law, while providing a test that—albeit 
still consisting of standards rather than a bright-line rule—provides greater 
certainty and administrability. 
 
